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ABSTRACT 
 
Objectives.  The objective of this project was to ascertain and quantify the effects of 
gender, age, payment method, and practice size on clinical output of GP/FPs.  While the 
identification of these effects has been undertaken previously, this study is the first 
attempt to quantify the proportion of variance in physician output explained by this 
group of variables. 
Background.  The question is of vital importance to academics, health professionals, 
and citizens.  The physician population is aging and feminizing while physicians are 
softening their opposition to fixed remuneration methods and displaying a greater 
predilection to group practice.  Implications exist for the supply of physician services as 
gender, age, payment method, and practice size have been found to influence physician 
output, and therefore the availability of primary care services. 
Methods.  The study employed self-reported data obtained from 1006 Canadian general 
and family practitioners in 2004.  Respondents provided their gender, age, payment 
method, and practice size, as well as the number of patient visits they conducted (both 
during regular hours and while on call) and the number of hours they worked in an 
average week.  These data were used to measure the effects of the four independent 
variables on GP/FP output and to quantify their total collective affect. 
Results.  By and large, the analysis confirmed the prevailing view of the literature, as 
female physicians; physicians in the youngest and oldest age categories; physicians 
remunerated mainly through fixed payment methods; and physicians in group practice 
reported lower levels of output than their counterparts.  Despite the presence of obvious 
trends in the data, in some cases the analysis was unable to uncover statistically 
significant differences in output between groups of physicians. 
 In terms of the contribution made by these four variables to the variance in 
GP/FP output, significant and parsimonious models contributed 16.2% of the variance in 
total patient visits, 19.3% of the variance in patient visits during regular hours, 2.5% of 
the variance in patient visits while on call, 11.1% of variance in hours worked per week, 
and 8.9% of the variance in patient visits per hour worked.   
Conclusion.  The four factor variables explained less than one fifth of the variance in all 
output categories.  This first attempt to quantify their contribution identifies an 
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important question: what accounts for the remaining variance?  If the unidentified 
factors are measurable, perhaps they can be added to these models in the future in order 
to increase our understanding of the forces behind GP/FP output of primary care 
services. 
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1.0 Introduction 
 
The Canadian health care industry exists within an environment of constant 
change.  Persistent technological improvements, evolving societal demands, the 
continuous reformation of public policy, and the ever transforming makeup and 
sentiment of the health care workforce coalesce to siege the stability of the industry.  
Ever present in the minds of health policy analysts, government officials, politicians, 
and the general public is accessibility to primary care services, and more specifically, 
access to primary care physicians.  The supply of physicians is an issue at the forefront 
of many health policy debates.  How can we guarantee that a physician will be available 
should we need one?  How can we be sure that our children and their children will be 
afforded that same guarantee? 
 The study will focus on the clinical output of general practitioners and family 
physicians, as these professionals are responsible for the delivery of primary care 
services to the Canadian population and serve as the gatekeepers to the remainder of the 
health system.  In addition, the gatekeeper role renders the process by which a patient 
receives an appointment to a GP/FP different from the process for an appointment to a 
specialist; specialist appointments, in Canada, are set usually after a referral has been 
granted by a GP/FP.  It can be argued as well that the service provided by GP/FPs is 
more homogeneous than the services provided by the entire breadth of specialists; 
therefore, the focus on GP/FPs eliminates the confusion that might result from the 
provision of significantly different services. 
 The study will contribute to the literature by: 1) quantifying the effects of 
gender, age, payment method and practice size on output of GP/FP clinical services and 
2) determining the relative importance of each.  The virtue of this line of questioning is 
in its implications for health human resource policy.  If we can identify the factors that 
influence physician output of patient visits, and determine the affect of each, we should 
be better able to predict the future supply of physician visits available to the population.  
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Without this type of inquiry, fully informed decisions regarding physician supply are 
difficult to make. 
 The study will test the effect of each output driver on GP/FP clinical output as 
measured by: the number of patient visits, both during regular hours and while on-call; 
hours worked; and patients seen per hour worked.  The study will employ data that were 
collected in 2004 through a survey of the Canadian physician population conducted by 
the Mercuri Group entitled Emerging Issues in the Work of Physicians.  Initial 
comparative analyses will be conducted through the use of t-tests and analyses of 
variance to identify the effect of each potential output driver.  Subsequently, single and 
multivariate modeling will be undertaken to determine the percentage of variance in 
output that can be explained by the identified output drivers and the relative strength of 
each independent variable in predicting each type of output.   
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2.0 Literature Review 
 
 The first objective of the literature review is to develop the study’s conceptual 
framework.  Subsequently, a scan of the current Canadian physician population will be 
presented.  After the structure of the workforce has been established, physician output is 
considered – both the ways in which it has been measured, and the factors that seem to 
hold influence over it.   
 
2.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
 From the standpoint of an economist, a visit by a citizen to a GP/FP is 
characterized as a service rendered by a seller (the physician) to a consumer (the 
patient).  The physical transaction, on the surface, is analogous to any service provided 
by a firm to a household.  Below the surface, however, the context within which 
Canadian physicians and citizens provide and seek medical treatment differs 
substantially from typical exchanges. 
 In a typical marketplace – provided that all of our able economist’s assumptions 
are met – the seller’s (for example, a hairdresser’s) willingness to provide a good or 
service differs depending upon the revenue that would be accrued through doing so.  
Similarly, a customer’s willingness to consume these goods or services differs 
depending upon their cost – the financial outlay necessary to procure them.  The price at 
which the seller is willing to provide what the buyer is willing to consume becomes the 
equilibrium price – the ‘going rate’ – for the good or service in question.  It follows that 
the quantity exchanged at the equilibrium price is known as the equilibrium quantity. 
 The market for health care services violates many of our economist’s 
assumptions.1,2,3  Phenomena which enable a market to operate efficiently, independent 
of outside intervention such as an absence of barriers to entry and the uniformity of 
information between buyer and seller, are arguably unmet.  Combine these violations 
with the fact that demand for health services is based, in large part, on needs as opposed 
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to preferences, and the result is significant market failure, as the market is unable to 
provide health services at the most optimal level.1  In Canada, as in most other 
industrialized nations, various levels of government have intervened, imposed 
regulations, and created insurance systems in an attempt to correct for these market 
failures.  These activities have rendered the market for health care services anything but 
normal.   
 The result, in Canada at least, has been to limit the role of demand in the 
determination of price, and therefore supply.  The majority of Canadian general 
practitioners are paid on a fee-for-service basis – a piece rate for each service rendered.  
These fees are set through negotiations between provincial governments and physician 
organizations.  A fee is then paid to a physician from taxpayers through the provincial 
insurance system when a particular treatment is provided to a patient.  The patient 
receives the treatment free of charge, as they have already contributed to the insurance 
pool through taxation.   
 Complicating matters is the increasing popularity of alternative payment 
methods (those other than the fee-for-service method just described).  Many physicians 
are choosing salaried remuneration schemes, contract, and arrangements that combine 
two or more methods.  In no case, however, does a patient pay for medical services out 
of their own pocket.  As such, the consumer’s ‘buy or go without’ decision that would 
be required in the functioning market has effectively been taken out of the health care 
equation. 
 That being said, individual demand for physician services cannot be completely 
ignored.  If the physician to population ratio changes or the evolving structure of the 
population results in changes in the need for health services, the number of patient visits 
supplied by the individual physician may change.  As a result, governments try to 
anticipate the future demand for physician services.  By doing so, they might adjust the 
number of medical school positions in an attempt to make the future supply of 
physicians meet the future demand.  This quasi-planned market model limits the role of 
consumer demand in the influence of supply.  To the extent that consumer demand is 
applicable, it is addressed through the government’s adjustment of medical school 
enrolments. 
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 This process creates a necessity for policy makers to anticipate the number of 
physicians required which, in turn, necessitates the identification of physician output.  
Physician output, as will be discussed in greater detail later in this text, can be calculated 
in a variety of ways.  The current study will measure physician output in five ways: 1) 
the total number of patient visits conducted by the physician; 2) the number of patient 
visits conducted by the physician during regular hours; 3) the number of patient visits 
conducted by the physician while on call; 4) the physician’s average hours worked per 
week; and 5) the number of patient visits conducted per hour worked. 
 One way to calculate GP/FP clinical output is to simply sum this output over the 
entire GP/FP population, where VA is the aggregate clinical output of GP/FPs, Vi is the 
output of the ith individual physician, and N is the total GP/FP population: 
∑
=
=
N
i
iA VV
1
                                                             (2.1) 
 Logistically speaking, it is difficult to precisely ascertain the output level of each 
individual physician.  As such, the aggregate supply of GP/FP clinical output can be 
derived by multiplying the total number of GP/FPs (N) by the average output of an 
individual physician ( iV ) – or an estimate of that amount.  The total supply of GP/FP 
visits (VA) will result:  
iA VNV ×=                                                            (2.2) 
Given the simple mathematics of the equation, both N and iV  are positively correlated 
with VA.  In other words, as one of N or iV  increases, so does VA.  If either decreases, VA 
follows.  If an increase in one is coupled with a corresponding decrease in the other, the 
effects will offset, either partially or completely. 
 At any moment in time, this calculation is quite simple, provided that the 
required information is at hand.  Physician counts are available through numerous 
organizations (the Canadian Medical Association and the Canadian Institute for Health 
Information to name two), and output figures can be obtained through billing records or 
through survey data, the latter of which is employed by the current study.  But how are 
N and iV  determined?  
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 The number of physicians practicing in Canada (N) is influenced to a large extent 
by public policy.  As stated above, the number of physicians present in Canada at any 
one time is the result of policy with regard to admission to MD training programs.  
Citizens entering medical school today are likely to become future physicians.  As such, 
the number of seats available in medical school classrooms is a strong predictor of the 
future physician supply.   
 Many factors, in addition to the size of medical school classrooms, impact upon 
the supply of physicians.  One major determinant is physician migration.  In addition to 
domestically trained physicians, Canada has a strong contingent of International Medical 
Graduates (IMGs) practicing within its borders.  On the other hand, many domestically 
trained physicians make the choice each year to relocate to other nations.  Physician 
migration, like migration in all areas, is influenced by a variety of phenomena – from 
comparative living standards, and perceived opportunity, to a chance for greater income 
security, geography, and even the weather.  While the government by no means has 
monopolistic influence over all of these variables, a great many are the product of public 
policy.  IMGs, like all new immigrants, are subject to Federal immigration policy.  
Changes to these immigration policies and to credentialing requirements will affect the 
ability of IMGs to enter Canada and start practicing medicine.  Public policy which 
impacts the lives of domestic physicians will also hold influence – however large or 
small – over their desire to remain practicing in Canada, as it would any other member 
of the population.  While it is impossible to pin down the breadth of variables that 
influence the size of the physician population, public policy is by far the most significant 
determinant. 
 Public Policy itself is influenced by a variety of phenomena.  As discussed 
above, governments attempt to predict the future need for physicians and adjust medical 
school admissions accordingly.  Demand for services (at least as it is interpreted by the 
powers that be) is therefore included in the equation through this process.  It is possible 
that other more political factors play a role in this process, but their inherent 
unpredictability eliminates them from serious consideration, at least from the point of 
view of the current study.  Therefore: 
,...),,( EMIMMDEfN =
                                           (2.3) 
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The supply of physicians is a function of medical school enrolments (MDE), physician 
immigration (IM), and physician emigration (EM).  More simply put: 
)(PolicyfN =
                                                       (2.4) 
The supply of physicians is a function of public policy.  As public policy in these areas 
changes, the total number of physicians can be expected to change as well. 
 The literature identifies factors that typically influence the clinical output of an 
individual physician ( iV ).  These include the age (A) and gender (G) of the physician, 
the country in which they received their medical training (MDG), the method through 
which they receive payment for their services (PAY), and the size of the physician group 
that they work within (GRP).  In addition to these tangible characteristics, the literature 
indicates that broader ‘lifestyle preferences’ (LP) often hold sway over output.  Some 
physicians simply choose to produce different levels of output than their colleagues.  
Conceptually speaking: 
),,,,,( LPGRPPAYMDGGAfV i =                                 (2.5) 
The average individual output is a function of physician age, gender, medical school of 
graduation, payment method, group size, and lifestyle preferences.  As the status of each 
of these variables evolves within the overall GP/FP population, a change in iV  will 
result.  This change in iV , in turn, can be expected to change the aggregate output of 
physician services.  For this reason, a simple physician count (N) is insufficient to 
predict the future availability of GP/FP visits. 
 To make such a prediction requires that one identify the trends in the variables 
that influence GP/FP clinical output.  If the age structure, the male to female ratio, the 
international to domestic ratio, the prevalence of the different payment methods, the size 
of physician groups, or the lifestyle preferences of physicians is expected to change, one 
would conclude that iV  is likely to change as well.  This study attempts to address that 
issue by quantifying the effect of each factor that holds potential influence over iV . 
 The framework presented in this section speaks to the importance of the present 
line of questioning.  To make appropriate decisions regarding physician supply, policy 
makers must look beyond the aggregate number of physicians.  A workforce full of 
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high-output physicians is different from a workforce made up of physicians whose 
output is lower.  If output influencing characteristics can be identified, their effects 
quantified, and this information put to use, physician supply decisions will more 
accurately reflect the society’s needs.  An attempt will now be made to describe the 
physician population. 
 
2.2 The Changing Physician Workforce 
 
 This section describes the state of the current Canadian physician workforce.  
Through this description, the current structure of the physician workforce will be 
explored and the different demographic trends identified.  This information is important; 
as the prevalence of each output influencing characteristic evolves within the physician 
population, the aggregate supply of physician services will evolve in kind.  After the 
physician workforce is presented, the focus will shift to the output influencing 
characteristics identified in the literature. 
 The physician workforce is experiencing the same occurances as the overall 
Canadian workforce – an aging population, an increase in the proportion of female 
labourers, and changing lifestyle preferences.4  In addition to these challenges, the 
workforce faces hurdles created by physician migration and location, and evolving 
training requirements.5 
 As discussed, various policy decisions taken on the part of government have 
dictated the current state of physician supply.  As far back as 1964, the Royal 
Commission on Health Services recommended Canada double the number of medical 
school enrolments that were then available.6  By 1976, over 1700 medical degrees were 
awarded by Canadian medical schools – an increase of over 100% on the number 
awarded in 1964.  The significant expansion in medical school output prompted Justice 
Emmit Hall, who chaired the aforementioned Royal Commission, to recommend a 
physician workforce study in 1980, to determine whether or not the supply expansion 
had gone too far.6  The workforce study was completed by provincial governments in 
1984 and, coupled with the 1991 Barer-Stoddart Report, prompted a reduction in 
medical school enrolments.6  
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 In 2004, there were 60,612 physicians practicing in Canada, an increase of just 
under 5600 physicians since 1993.7  A publication written by Chan for the Canadian 
Institute for Health Information (CIHI) entitled Perceived Surplus to Perceived Shortage 
reports that net physician flow averaged +1,040 per year between 1990 and 1993, but 
fell to just +313 per year between 1994 and 2000.5  The report submits a list of factors 
that were responsible for this decrease in net flow of physicians and their percentage 
contribution, in decreasing order:5 
• Increase in the length of time spent in postgraduate training, post 1993 and 
increase in the number of specialist trainees in relation to general practice 
trainees – 25% 
 
• Decreased intake of international medical graduates – 22% 
 
• A return to normal rates of enrolment in medical schools, which had 
uncharacteristically ballooned between 1987 and 1993 – 21% 
 
• Increased retirements – 17% 
 
• Decreased medical school enrolment – 11% 
 
• Loss of physicians to the US and other countries – 3% 
 
 Curiously, Chan attributed just 14% of the reduction to decreased medical school 
enrolments and the loss of physicians to other countries – the two issues which seem to 
receive the most publicity.  The most influential events, on the other hand, seem to fall 
largely outside the scope of the 1991 Barer-Stoddart report.  On the other hand, it is 
prudent to consider the possibility that the ‘uncharacteristic ballooning’ of enrolment 
rates referred to in Chan’s third point may not have been uncharacteristic at all.  Perhaps 
the enrolment observed between 1987 and 1993 would have continued if it had not been 
restricted by decisions taken on the part of policy makers. 
 Between 1986 and 1994, the physician population grew by 20.5%, while the 
overall Canadian population grew by just 13.9%, resulting in an increased physician to 
citizen ratio.5  The ratio peaked in 1993 at 190.8 physicians per 100,000 people, but 
dropped between 1993 and 1997, only to increase again steadily into the early part of the 
new millennium.  In 2003, the ratio was 188.7 physicians per 100,000, slightly below 
the 1993 peak.5   
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 In recent years the overall physician to citizen ratio has remained relatively 
constant and if retirement, graduation, and net migration rates hold steady, the current 
physician to citizen ratio is expected to persist.8  While the literature indicates that the 
physician population has remained constant relative to the civilian population, the 
changing structure of the two has stretched the capacity of the average physician causing 
individual physician workloads to increase.5  In addition, there are demographic and 
geographic, as well as personal and practice characteristics that drive physician output of 
patient visits and the propensity to engage in patient care.9  GP/FP output on the 
aggregate has changed and will continue to change as the structure of the physician 
workforce evolves.  One must therefore explore the workforce beyond the sum of 
individual physicians in order to accurately anticipate the supply of physician services 
into the future. 
 The physician population is experiencing structural changes on a number of 
fronts, including age and gender makeup, payment method, practice size, and specialty 
mix.  The female proportion, currently 32% of the total, has been steadily increasing in 
recent years and is relatively more concentrated in the younger age groups.4,8,10 In 
medical school classrooms since 1995, females have comprised 50% or more of the 
student population.8  By 2015, it is expected that the female proportion of the overall 
physician workforce will reach 40%.8 
 In addition to a shift in gender makeup, the workforce is experiencing changes in 
its age structure.  Approximately 44% of the total workforce was 50 years of age or 
older in 2004 (up from 39% in 1999) and just 24% of Canadian physicians were under 
40 years of age (down from 28% in 1999).10  Of the total female physician population, 
72% were below the age of 50, compared to 48% of males.10  The average age of the 
total physician workforce was 48.6 – three years older than in 19937 – and the number of 
new entrants to the ‘less than 30’ age group has fallen steadily since 1999.10  This trend 
toward an increasing proportion of aging physicians may result in significant 
ramifications for policy makers.  In addition, historic differences in the work habits of 
male and female physicians (addressed in detail below) cannot be ignored when one 
considers that an increasing proportion of younger physicians are female. 
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Family physicians, on average, are younger than their colleagues who have opted 
to specialize.  This age discrepancy is most certainly due, in part, to the comparatively 
lengthier training requirements for the specialties.  In 2002, the average specialist was 
48.8 years of age while the average family practitioner was 46.6 years of age.11  The gap 
has narrowed since 1993, when the average specialist was 48.1 and the average GP was 
43.3.11  These figures would suggest that increases in the average age of the overall 
physician population have been felt mostly within the family practice ranks. 
 The ratio of specialists to general practice physicians has remained relatively 
stable over the last decade.  Between 199312 and 2004,4 the percentage of specialists 
increased from 47%12 to 48%.4  Compared to their male colleagues, female physicians 
are more likely to enter family practice and opt against specialization, though as time 
passes, this is becoming less and less the case.  In 1993, of the approximate 13,500 
female physicians practicing in Canada, just 36% were specialists; 12 this percentage sat 
at 41% in 2005.10  Just over half (50.03%) of male physicians were specialists in 1993,12 
compared with 51.8% in 2005.10  Of the total specialist population, the female 
proportion has risen from 19% in 199312 to 27% in 2005.10  This shows clearly that 
female physicians are displaying an increasing propensity to specialize. 
 The percentage of physicians practicing in Canada who received their medical 
degrees abroad has decreased moderately over the last decade.  In 1993, these 
International Medical Graduates comprised 25% of Canada’s physician workforce; this 
percentage had fallen to 23.9% by 2005.13  This reduction has come about mainly as a 
result of a reduced dependency on international specialists, as our reliance on IMG 
family practitioners fell from 23.3% in 1993 to 22.3% in 2002 – just 1% -- while 
reliance on IMG specialists fell from 27% to 22.8% over the same time period.13  
According to the Canadian Medical Association (CMA), IMGs practicing in Canada 
tend to be older than their domestically trained counterparts.  In 2002, 47% of IMGs 
were above the age of 55, compared with 29% of all physicians.10  The same CMA 
study suggests that, relative to the domestically trained workforce, a smaller proportion 
of IMGs are female. 
 Also evolving are the methods through which physicians receive payment for 
their services.  There are three main methods of physician remuneration in Canada: fee-
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for-service (FFS), salary, and blended methods.14  According to the CMA National 
Physician Survey conducted in 2003, 56.9% of Canadian physicians are paid strictly 
through fee-for-service.  Another 7.6% reported that they are compensated on a salaried 
basis, and the remaining 32% who offered a response were remunerated through a 
blended payment method.10  Comparatively, in 1990, the figures were 67.5%, 9.2%, and 
20.8% for FFS, salary, and blended methods respectively.10  These values represent a 
clear shift toward alternative payment methods – those other than fee-for-service.  In 
2003, males were moderately more likely to receive remuneration through fee-for-
service (59.1%) than females (52.5%); differences were not as substantial for other 
methods of payment.10 
 The CMA survey also asked physician to report their preferred method of 
remuneration.10  Interestingly, 27.1% report a preference for salaried remuneration, 
compared to 36.5% for FFS.  This gap has narrowed significantly since 1995, when 
preferences were 18.3% and 50.4% respectively.  Preference for blended payment has 
actually decreased from 25.0% to 21.1% over the same time period.  Preferences for 
salaried and FFS remuneration are virtually even among females (30.8% and 29.4% 
respectively), but males tend to prefer FFS (25.2% and 40.1%).  The CMA study also 
reports an inverse relationship between age and preference for salaried remuneration. 
 In addition to the changing age and gender structure and the general practice to 
specialist ratio, the practice settings of Canadian physicians’ are also evolving.8  
According to the Physican Human Resource Strategy for Canada Task Force 
(PHRSCT), 64% of GP/FPs surveyed reported being active in group practices in 1998.  
The report suggested that this number could be expected to increase as the physician 
population evolves, stating that younger physicians were placing greater emphasis on a 
balanced lifestyle and flexible working hours.8 
 In light of this evidence, the Canadian physician workforce is clearly in 
transition.  The changing face of the physician population, as will be shown below, is 
likely to result in significant implications for the supply of patient visits, even if the 
physician to citizen ratio remains constant.  The discussion now turns toward physician 
output and the characteristics which increase and decrease physician propensity to see 
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patients. 
 
2.3 Output Measurement Tools 
 Physician productivity can be measured in a number of different ways.  A 
discussion paper released by the American Academy of Family Physicians (AAFP) 
identifies several traditional methods used to measure physician productivity.15  One of 
the traditional measures is a simple observation of workload, either through the sum of 
office visits by patients, or a count of hours worked.  By determining the number of 
patients a physician tends to over a given period of time, or the number of hours he or 
she works, one can make inferences about productivity relative to the rest of the 
workforce.  One study that employed this method of analysis was that conducted by 
Sloan in 1975, entitled Physician Supply Behaviour in the Short Run.16 
 A common limitation to these traditional measures of productivity is their 
inability to take into account differences in difficulty associated with different types of 
physician activities.  By tracking only the number of patients a physician sees, one is not 
able to measure the amount of effort devoted to each specific case.  Likewise, the sum of 
a physician’s work hours over a given time period is not sufficient information to 
measure the effort expended.15,8   
 In order to combat these limitations, some studies have employed the use of 
Relative Value Units (RVUs)15,17 – factors which apply additional weight to more 
complex medical procedures – in their output calculations.  This convention spawned 
the development of the Resource Based Relative Value Scale (RBRVS) in the United 
States.  The RBRVS provides weightings for each physician service based on their 
relative requirement for: time; technical skill and physical effort; mental effort and 
judgment; and psychological stress.  The RBRVS has been employed by the American 
Medicare system and other American third party payment organizations to measure 
physician productivity.17 
 The Canada’s Physician Workforce report released in 2005 by the Physician 
Human Resource Strategy for Canada Task Force suggests that while a direct physician 
headcount is important when calculating administrative and overhead costs, physician 
Full Time Equivalents (FTEs), which attempt to account for practice intensity, are a 
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better measure of physician supply.8  An FTE measurement creates a single value for an 
individual physician and reports his or her workload in relation to what is considered a 
‘full load.’   
 Given the methodology used to calculate FTEs, the total number of physician 
FTEs would equal the total number of physicians if all physicians measured were 
working ‘full loads.’  A physician with an FTE measurement equal to 1.0 has a 
workload exactly equal to what is considered a maximized practice.  A physician with a 
lower FTE is working a lighter load, and a physician with an FTE above 1.0 has a 
workload greater than a ‘full load’.  The sum of all individual FTE measures yields the 
total number of physician FTEs in the region.  According to the Canadian Institute for 
Health Information, Canada had 44,234 FTEs in 2003, an average of 0.84 FTE per 
physician.5 
 Another method identified in the AAFP paper and employed in the literature is 
dollars generated by a physician practice.15  For physicians remunerated through fee-for-
service in Canada, measurement through this method is relatively simple.  The Canadian 
Institute for Health Information combines this method with the use of FTEs to measure 
physician productivity in its 2001 report The Practicing Physician Community in 
Canada.9  One drawback to this bill submission method is the difficulty in measuring 
workload for physicians remunerated through alternative payment arrangements.8  
Salaried physicians, for instance, do not submit claims that can be conveniently tracked.  
Physicians who receive payment through fee-for-service and additional payment through 
another method (a blended arrangement) will also be misrepresented by a straight count 
of fee-for-service billing. 
 One of the main issues concerning the present study is the need to capture the 
entire physician population.  Many of the billing and FTE methods presented above 
limit the ability to include physicians remunerated through alternative payment methods.  
As such, the present study employs the use of questionnaire data, obtained directly from 
Canadian physicians.  The specifics of the data source, as well as the limitations to this 
methodology are discussed in later sections. 
 In the following discussion of physician productivity drivers, all of the literature 
cited employs a variation of one of these productivity measures.  Given that each 
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measure is able to reflect physician productivity, the specific method used is not overly 
important when identifying drivers.  What is important are the characteristics that are 
identified as being influential in determining physician productivity. 
 
2.4 Output Drivers 
 
 The literature identifies seven broad factors that may influence physicians’ 
output of patient visits: specialization;5,9 gender;5, 8, 9, 10, 15, 18 age;5, 8, 9, 10, 15, 18 
remuneration method;5, 8, 9, 10, 15, 18 practice setting;8, 15, 19 medical school of graduation;5, 
8, 9
 and other less tangible lifestyle preferences.8  In this section, an attempt will be made 
to identify specific characteristics presented in the literature that may influence 
physician productivity and report the relevant trends in the physician population 
associated with each driver. 
Specialty.  In many respects, physician productivity can only be effectively discussed 
by separating physicians by their broad specialization category.  Medical specialists, 
clinical specialists, and family practice physicians engage in different types of activity.  
CIHI’s 2001 Practicing Physician Community in Canada reports that surgical specialists 
display the highest activity ratios, followed by medical specialists and then primary care 
physicians.9  Specialists are working longer hours on patient care and providing more 
services than they were in the 1980s, whereas family physicians are not. 9, 10  As such, it 
is impractical to assess physician productivity on a workforce-wide basis.  Original 
statistical analysis conducted within the present study will focus on the gatekeepers to 
the Canadian health system – General and Family Practice physicians. 
Age.   The literature suggests, overwhelmingly, that a change in the age structure of the 
physician population will create significant future implications for the aggregate output 
of patient visits.5  As physicians grow older, their productivity increases to a point, after 
which it begins to decrease.  In 2001, Chan suggested that workload amongst fee-for-
service physicians is highest within the 50 – 59 age group, followed closely by the 40 – 
49 age group.5  Output for older and younger physicians is less, to a statistically 
significant degree.5  A 2003 study conducted by the CMA corroborates this curvilinear 
relationship between age and output.  Although age groupings were reported differently, 
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the CMA study suggested physicians between the ages of 45 and 65 worked, on average, 
a greater number of hours per week than their colleagues in other age groups.10 
 The JANUS report published by the College of Family Physicians of Canada 
reported an average workload of 102.27 patients per week (excluding patients seen 
during on-call hours) for physicians in the 55 – 64 age group; the highest workload for 
any age group.18  Patient load increased with age, peaking at the 55 – 64 group, and then 
falling off considerably for physicians 65 years of age and older.18  The American 
Academy of Family Physicians gives further weight to these findings, reasoning that 
perhaps as physicians age beyond the most productive group they devote less time 
toward direct patient care and spend more time on each individual patient that they do 
encounter.15   
 Perhaps one explanation for relatively lighter workloads amongst younger 
physicians is the higher prevalence of female physicians – who tend to have relatively 
lighter workloads – in the younger age groups.9, 10  Another potential explanation is 
changing physician lifestyle preferences.8  Both gender and lifestyle issues are discussed 
in greater detail below. 
 As the structure of the physician population evolves, the resulting changes in 
aggregate physician productivity will have significant impact on overall output of 
physician services. A large proportion (54%) of the physician population is currently 
situated between the ages of 30 and 50.4  The aging of this cohort into the future may 
create upward pressure on aggregate physician productivity as physicians from the 
younger age groups enter the highly productive 50 – 60 group.  This is, however, 
contingent upon this cohort adopting the work habits of the current physicians who 
occupy the 50 – 60 age group, which may not necessarily be the case.8 
 Once the majority of physicians surpass the 50 – 59 age group, productivity 
within this cohort will decrease substantially if current tendencies continue.  
Complicating matters further, the aging physician workforce is expected to result in an 
increase in the number of physician retirements each year.  According to the Physician 
Human Resource Strategy Task Force (PHRST) report entitled Physician Workforce in 
Canada, physicians working in the hospital system tend to retire at age 70.8  While this 
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is significantly later in life than the national average (62), PHRST reports that retirement 
age is decreasing as more physicians opt for early retirement.8   
 The aging physician population might result in increased output of patient visits 
in the immediate future, if physicians moving into the most productive age groups adopt 
the practice patterns of those who went before them.  The curvilinear relationship 
between age and patient visit output will eventually cause output to decline, however, as 
the bulk of the workforce moves past their most productive years.  This decline, 
combined with an increasing rate of retirement – also a product of the aging workforce – 
may substantially reduce physician output on the aggregate.  Forecasts such as these, 
however, assume that current trends and workload patterns will continue into the future.  
In reality, there exist some factors that may influence trends in these variables.  These 
are discussed below. 
Gender.  As suggested previously, the structure of the Canadian physician population 
with regards to gender is evolving.  Historically, the careers of female physicians have 
significantly differed from those of their male counterparts.20, 21, 22, 23, 24  As Rhonda 
Birenbaum submits, “from practice patterns to practice structure, from specialist 
availability to service mix, from billing characteristics to public expectations, it seems 
female doctors just do things differently from their male colleagues.”21  A Dutch study 
conducted between 1982 and 2001 and published in 2005 by Mayorova et al suggests 
that male propensity to become a general practitioner significantly decreased over the 
period of the study.  They added that female physicians, more likely to become general 
practitioners, are also more inclined to opt for a group practice setting than their male 
counterparts.22  A 2003 American study reported conflicting results, suggesting that the 
practice patterns of male and female physicians were generally similar.25  
 A 2002 Australian study conducted by Kilmartin et al reported that the key 
issues for women in medical practice included: job satisfaction; life balance between 
personal and work life; autonomy; availability of flexible work and training; 
affordability of professional expenses; fair remuneration; and obtaining influence.  The 
study suggested that societal demands have not kept up with the evolution of the 
physician workforce – women are still expected to fill the role of ‘homemaker’ while at 
the same time fulfilling the same duties in their professional lives as men.26 
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 One common theme throughout the literature more specific to the current study 
is the tendency shown by female physicians to spend more time on individual patients, 
but see fewer patients overall.5, 9, 10, 27  Chan reported in 2003 that in all age groups, 
across all three broad specializations, female physicians, on average, work fewer hours 
per week than their male counterparts.5  The 2005 version of the JANUS survey released 
by the College of Family Physicians of Canada supports the CMA release, reporting that 
female physicians work fewer hours on direct patient care per week (30.5 to 35.9) and 
see fewer patients (82.49 to 102.82) than their male counterparts.  Total hours worked 
(direct patient care plus indirect patient care, teaching, research, etc) were 53.1 for males 
and 46.2 for females.18  The results of these two reports are further supported by the 
Practicing Physician Community in Canada publication released by the Canadian 
Institute for Health Information in 2001, which reported that the activity ratio for 
females was about 80% of that for male physicians.9 
 It appears that the changing structure of the population with regard to gender will 
have an effect on aggregate output, opposite to the initial effects of aging.  As stated in 
the opening subsection to this chapter, female representation in the physician workforce 
is increasing relative to the overall workforce.  As identified in the literature, female 
physicians, particularly those in the youngest age groups where the greatest influx will 
be felt, tend to work substantially fewer hours and see fewer patients than their male 
colleagues.  This ‘feminization’ of the physician workforce, as it has been dubbed, will 
create downward pressure on aggregate supply of physician services. 
Medical School.  The practice patterns of International Medical Graduates in Canada 
are understudied.  However, as reported above, we know Canada’s reliance on 
international physicians – at least as far as reliance can be measured by their presence – 
is decreasing.12  Furthermore, the IMG proportion of the workforce is older than the rest 
of the physician population and can be expected to have a greater rate of retirement.8  
With regard to output, a 2001 CIHI study reports physicians who graduated from 
medical schools outside of North America have higher workload ratios than those who 
received their MD from Canadian and American medical schools.9  If Canada’s reliance 
on international medical graduates continues to decrease, CIHI suggests, a 10% drop in 
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physician activity and output can be expected, ceteris paribus, when the current cohort 
of international physicians retires.5 
Payment Method.  The method through which a physician is remunerated can 
significantly influence productivity.5,8, 9, 10, 15, 18  Under a fee-for-service payment model, 
a clear financial incentive exists for a physician to be as productive as possible, in terms 
of patient throughput.  The more patients a fee-for-service physician sees, the greater the 
number of claims submitted to the provincial insurer.  On the other hand, a salaried 
physician is not presented with the same financial incentive, given the stability of the 
payment received over prescribed periodic intervals.  This discrepancy in incentives 
creates very real implications for output of patient visits. 
 Leitch and Walker, in their 1999 paper The Basics of Physician Compensation, 
cite this ‘risk of inadequate level of service’ as one of the weaknesses of the salaried 
remuneration method.28  Xu and Yu confirm this weakness, submitting that the “service 
volume provided by salaried physicians is consistently lower than that by FFS 
physicians.”29  These claims are supported in a discussion paper prepared for the 2002 
Romanow Commission by Grignon et al.14  As such, the trend toward alternative 
methods of remuneration (as submitted previously) – many of which contain a salaried 
component – may result, ceteris paribus, in decreased overall physician productivity on 
the aggregate. 
Practice Setting.  The American Academy of Family Physicians, in their Physician 
Productivity Discussion Paper report that characteristics of the practice in which the 
physician works may affect overall productivity.15  In particular, they suggest, the 
mission and vision of the organization, as well of the size of the practice may have some 
influence on output.15  One of the earliest studies of physician productivity was that 
conducted by Reinhardt in 1975 entitled A Production Function for Physician 
Services.19  Through his research, the author found that physicians in single specialty 
groups oversaw between 4.5 and 5.1 percent more patient visits and produced about 
5.6% more billings than their solo practice counterparts.19 
 The PHRST identifies a trend away from solo practice toward group practices.8  
Specifically, younger physicians and females are choosing group practices at greater 
rates.  Perhaps in contradiction to Reinhardt’s assertion, Hale suggests the move toward 
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group practice is an attempt to achieve a more balanced lifestyle, implying a higher rate 
of output for solo practitioner.30  This logic is supported by the College of Family 
Physicians of Canada, who suggest younger family doctors are choosing group practice 
because their obligations are limited to their shift.31  This trend has led to an increase in 
the number of physicians working in walk-in clinics.  The move toward group practices 
may result in a change to the effective supply of physician services, if indeed physicians 
in group practice have different workloads.  The increased popularity of group practice, 
PHRST suggests, can be partially contributed to changing lifestyle preferences amongst 
physicians.8 
Lifestyle Preferences.  The driver that interweaves all of those previously listed is the 
changing lifestyle preferences of the physician population.  While the potential affect of 
each previous driver has been espoused, the anticipated effects of each driver have been 
forecasted under the assumption of ceteris paribus – that is, that all other variables 
would remain constant.  Changing lifestyle preferences may significantly alter the trends 
in each driver, threatening this assumption, and causing their effective impact to deviate 
from that predicted.8 
 Data suggests physicians, especially younger physicians, are opting for more 
balanced lifestyles.8  As mentioned above, younger physicians are more likely to prefer 
salaried remuneration, which offers income stability.8,10  Younger physicians also seem 
to work fewer hours, and prefer greater predictability.5,8,10  The trend toward group 
practice may also be attributable to changing lifestyle preferences, as physicians seek a 
way to more effectively distribute their workloads and allow greater flexibility.  It is 
difficult to precisely predict the effect that these changing lifestyle preferences will have 
on aggregate physician productivity, but it would appear as though the most prevalent 
changes will place downward pressure on the output of physician services.  
 
2.5 External Considerations 
 
 As much as extraneous factors have influenced physician output and supply, we 
can count on them to continue to do so.  It can be expected, for instance, that 
governments, having kept a wary eye on the evolving structure of the physician 
workforce, will take action to combat the impending shortage in the supply of 
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physicians – indeed they already have.  There have been recent calls for increases to 
medical school admissions from governments, professional organizations, and medical 
schools.32  Some regions of the country have already responded by increasing 
enrolments.33  Therefore, when anticipating the output of patient visits for Canada’s 
future General and Family practitioner population, it is imperative to factor in any 
foreseeable relevant public policy shifts pertaining to physician supply.  
 Virtually any study with health policy implications would be remiss not to 
include a brief discussion of the public-private debate.  With regard to the supply of 
patient visits, some suggest the introduction of a second private tier, in addition to the 
current publicly funded health system, would ‘free-up’ room within the latter.34  In 
reality, access to health care depends a great deal upon the supply of physician services.  
As discussed above, physician output of patient visits is driven by two broad factors: 1) 
the size and structure of the physician population, and 2) the presence of output inducing 
characteristics within the population.  In order to positively impact upon waiting times 
by creating space within the public system, such a shift in policy would have to lead to 
either: 1) an increase in the size of the physician population (N); or 2) an increase in the 
prevalence of output inducing characteristics which would increase the average 
physician output ( iV ). 
 As discussed previously, a review of the literature identified several 
characteristics which appear to influence physician output, including gender, age, 
payment method, and group size.  It is difficult to fathom how privatization would 
influence the gender, age, payment, or group structure of the physician population in 
such a way as to cause an increase in iV .  As a result, any immediate increase in the 
aggregate output of patient visits would have to arise from an increase in the total supply 
of physicians (N-private + N-public).  The proponents of privatization are silent on how 
the introduction of the second tier will lead to this necessary increase in the number of 
physicians disproportionate to the increase in the Canadian population. 
 Another widely debated issue on the Canadian health care landscape is primary 
care reform.  As manifest in Canadian health care, this process seeks to revamp the way 
that primary care services are delivered within the country.  Support for the general 
concept is more or less universal; however, the same cannot be said for the process or 
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blueprint for a new system.  The debate is comprised of two schools of thought: the 
professional and the community model.35  The former advocates an integrated approach 
to health care through which the physician remains primarily responsible for the 
provision of health services.  The community vision is broader in scope, placing 
emphasis on the overall well-being of the population and reducing physicians to just one 
aspect of health care.35 
 As the point of first contact, general and family practitioners currently serve as 
gatekeepers to the rest of the health system.  Depending on which vision prevails, 
primary care reform threatens to move control over patient referral from the physician to 
other health professionals, resulting in significant implications for physician output.  If 
the physician’s role as gatekeeper is diminished, patients need no longer report to 
physicians for first contact to the system.  As such, output as measured by patient visits 
may drastically decline. 
 While it is important to acknowledge the issues and future policy changes that 
have the potential to alter the primary care landscape and through it the supply of 
physician services, the focus of this study is on the characteristics that influence GP/FP 
output of physician services within the current healthcare context.  However, the 
discussion will address any implications that may arise from the interaction between this 
study’s results and potential policy changes. 
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3.0 Methods 
 
3.1 Objectives 
 
 The primary objective of this study is to identify the factors that influence 
physician output of services as measured by: their patient visits during regular hours, on-
call hours, and total hours; the number of hours they work; and the number of patients 
they see per hour.  The study also seeks to quantify the combined effect of these 
‘drivers’ on physician output through regression techniques. 
 
3.2 Data Source  
 
 Study data were extracted from the Emerging Issues in the Work of Physicians 
study conducted by the MERCURI Group – of which the author is a member – at the 
University of Saskatchewan in 2004.  Comprehensive questionnaires (Appendix A) 
containing sections on: quality of health services; health policy issues; professional 
equity; time spent on activities; stress and management of stress; organization of 
practice; career satisfaction (including satisfaction with performance) and demographics, 
were sent to a sample of 5300 physicians across Canada.   
The study sample was stratified to over-represent female physicians as well as 
physicians practicing in smaller communities, and in less populous provinces.  Of the 
respondents, 149 were ineligible for a variety of reasons including: retirement, limited 
involvement in clinical care, maternity leave, return to medical school, serious illness, or 
death.  In addition, 193 had moved, resulting in an eligible study population of 4958.  Of 
these, 2810 returned questionnaires with very few missing values (56.7% response).   
The present study focuses on the data received from 1006 General Practice and Family 
Practice physicians.  As such, respondents from all other specialties were excluded. 
A one page survey was sent to the 2148 non-responding members of the sample 
in order to test for response bias.  This non-response survey contained key items from 
the original questionnaire and was returned by 686 of the physicians who received it.  
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Non-response bias was not detected on the basis of: 1) support for the Canadian health 
system; 2) authority to make clinical decisions; 3) location; 4) specialty; 5) language; or 
6) gender.  Non-responding physicians were slightly more satisfied with their career 
than responding physicians.  Adjustments for bias were not deemed necessary. 
 
3.3 Stratification 
 
 The sample over-represented females in order to balance the response rate.  The 
study received 528 responses from female GP/FPs and 478 responses from their male 
colleagues for a total of 1006 responses.  This 52.5% to 47.5% female to male split does 
not reflect the reported 35% to 65% female to male split in the actual GP/FP population.  
The stratification will not affect differences in output measures for the direct comparison 
between males and females.  Since gender was found to influence output, tests for the 
effects of other independent variables on output would have been distorted.  As such, the  
effects of the other variables on output will be tested separately for males and females.  
The other factors by which the sample was stratified were expected to have a negligible 
effect on reported patient visits.  As such, adjustment of the sample based on other 
variables was deemed unnecessary. 
 
3.4  Measures 
 
3.4.1 Dependent Variables 
Patient Visits 
 Recipients of the Emerging Issues in the Work of Physicians questionnaire were 
asked to report the number of patients they saw during an average week, during both 
regular hours and hours on call.  These responses were used as two separate dependent 
variables: 1) patient visits per week during regular hours; and 2) patient visits per week 
during on-call hours.  In addition, a third patient load variable was created by summing 
the two to yield total patient visits per week (the sum of 1 & 2). 
Hours Worked 
 Respondents to the questionnaire were also asked to report the number of hours 
they worked in an average week, excluding on call hours.  Responses to this question 
were used as a dependent variable. 
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Patients Per Hour 
 The final dependent variable was computed by dividing the reported regular 
patient visits per week by the reported hours worked per week.  The numerator must be 
the regular hours measure, because the denominator excludes on call hours worked. 
 Collectively, this contingent of dependent variables reaches a broad array of 
output categories.  The three ‘volume’ measures – total patient visits per week, patient 
visits per week during regular hours, and patient visits per week during on call – provide 
a measure of the overall output of actual patient visits and measure access to a GP/FP on 
a level that is important to the population as a whole.  The remaining measures – hours 
worked per week and patients per hour worked – provide insight into how physicians are 
using their time.  
 
3.4.2 Independent Variables 
Gender 
 Questionnaire recipients were asked to report their gender; male or female.  This 
binary variable was used to compare male and female scores on the five dependent 
variables during the comparative analysis procedures.  Much has been made of the 
distinction between sex and gender.  Respondents were asked to report their gender, as 
opposed to their sex.  Given the frequent usage of the former in common dialogue, it is 
reasonable to assume that the vast majority of respondents would not have altered their 
answers had the question been alternatively posed.  It is also reasonable to assume a 
high degree of co-linearity between gender and sex. 
Age 
 Respondents to the questionnaire were also asked to report their age in raw 
numerical terms.  These values were used to group physicians according to prescribed 
age categories for the purposes of the one way analysis of variance procedure.  The 
study employed the groupings used by the Canadian Medical Association in their 
reporting of physician supply.  The groupings are as follows: less than 35 years of age; 
between 35 and 44 years of age (inclusive); between 45 and 54 years of age (inclusive); 
between 55 and 64 years of age (inclusive); and 65 years of age or older.  For the 
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purposes of the regression techniques, the raw scores were employed as a continuous 
variable and applied to the model. 
Payment Method 
 Respondents were asked to report the percentage of their remuneration derived 
from various methods: 1) fee-for-service; 2) salary; 3) capitated rate per patient; 4) 
sessional; 5) other.  This information was used to create two independent measures of 
payment method.  For the purposes of the comparative analyses, a three level variable 
grouped responding physicians as follows: 1) > 80% fee-for-service remuneration; 2) 
20% - 80% fee-for-service remuneration; 3) < 20% fee-for-service remuneration.  The 
literature suggests a clear difference in patient loads between physicians remunerated 
mostly through fee-for-service payments and those remunerated mostly through 
alternative methods.  It was not abundantly clear, however, what affect the heavily 
blended methods (the middle group) would have on output.  As such, this three level 
variable was created to separate the extremes from the blended middle group, and isolate 
the effects of each.  For the purposes of the regression analysis, the percent fee-for-
service variable (the raw data collected from the questionnaire) was simply entered into 
the model as a continuous variable.  
Practice Size 
 The final independent variable was also obtained from the survey data.  
Respondents were asked to report the number of physicians that work in their main 
practice setting.  The literature identifies flexibility in work schedule as a possible 
reason for the influence of practice size on physician output.  As such, responses to this 
question were used to split the sample into five categories: 1) solo practitioners; 2) 
physicians with 1 partner; 3) physicians with 2 partners; 4) physicians with 3 partners; 
and 5) physicians with 4 or more partners. 
 
3.5 Procedures 
 
 Broadly speaking, two types of statistical techniques were carried out within this 
study.  The first was a series of one way comparisons – either t-tests or analyses of 
variance (ANOVA) procedures – that compared physician output on the basis of the 
independent variables described above.  The one way techniques demonstrated the effect 
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that each individual independent variable has on the output of physician services as 
measured by the dependent variables. 
 The second type of analysis consisted of regression techniques.  These 
procedures were used to estimate the combined effect of all of the independent variables 
on the five output measures.  The regression analyses were used to produce a series of r² 
values that indicated the ‘percentage of variance’ explained by the combined effects of 
the independent variables.  In addition to the r² values, the regression procedures also 
produced standardized beta values, with which the strength of the relationships between 
the dependent and independent variables could be compared.  The two techniques, in the 
context of the current study, are described below in more detail. 
 
3.5.1 Comparative Analyses 
 Each comparative procedure focused on the relationship between the dependent 
variables and one of the independent variables.  As described in section 3.4, the 
independent variables were split into different levels (gender, for example, into male and 
female; group size into solo, 2, 3, 4, and 5+).  The independent sample t-test was used to 
compare mean scores between two independent samples.  With respect to the current 
study the t-test was the appropriate test to compare output scores on the basis of gender, 
as gender has two distinct categories – male and female.  The test statistic employed in 
this comparison is as follows: 
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Where: 
1X = mean of sample taken from population 1 (females) 
2X = mean of sample taken from population 2 (males) 
2
pS = pooled variance 
1n = size of sample taken from population 1 (females) 
2n = size of sample taken from population 2 (males) 
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 The t-test just described was not appropriate to compare variables with three or 
more parameters.  The independent variables employed by the current study, in addition 
to gender (age, payment method, and practice size), consist of more than two 
parameters.  Comparisons for these independent variables required ANOVA, which, 
through an analysis of the variation in the data, both within and between the groups, 
allows the researcher to reach conclusions about possible differences.  The test statistic 
for the analyses of variance is the F-test: 
MSW
MSAF =                                                                (3.2) 
Where MSA is the mean square among groups and MSW is the mean square within 
groups.  The analyses of variance procedures demonstrated whether or not differences in 
means existed.  These procedures also allowed the researcher to conduct post hoc 
analyses in order to determine exactly which groups differ from one another.  This study 
employed the Scheffe post hoc analysis where ANOVA identified differences. 
 For the purposes of this study, a significance level (or p-value) of 0.05 was 
employed.  The p-value presents the probability that observed differences are a product 
of chance.  If a relationship has a p-value of 0.05, the likelihood that the observed 
difference is a product of chance is just 5% - 5 out of 100.  The smaller the p-value, the 
less likely it is that an observed difference is the result of chance.  If a relationship has a 
p-value greater than 0.05 it was rejected, as the probability of chance was considered too 
high.   
 The t-test to compare males to females was the only procedure that employed the 
entire sample.  As stated earlier, the sample was stratified to over-represent females.  
This means that the ratio of male to female physicians within the sample exceeded that 
same ratio for the actual GP/FP population.  For comparisons between the genders, this 
did not distort the statistical outcomes, but for comparisons on the basis of other 
independent variables, ANOVA was conducted separately for males and females, since 
the over-representation of females could have skewed the results.  In total, 30 ANOVAS 
and 5 t-tests were performed: 
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Table 3.5a – Comparative Analyses Conducted 
Independent Variable Test Dependent Variables 
Patients per Week During Regular Hours 
Patients per Week During On Call Hours 
Total Patients per Week 
Total Hours per Week 
Gender: Males vs. Females t-test 
Patients per Hour 
Patients per Week During Regular Hours 
Patients per Week During On Call Hours 
Total Patients per Week 
Total Hours per Week 
Age – Female: <35 vs. 35-44 vs. 45-54 
vs. 55-65 vs. 65+ ANOVA (F-test) 
Patients per Hour 
Patients per Week During Regular Hours 
Patients per Week During On Call Hours 
Total Patients per Week 
Total Hours per Week 
Payment Method – Female: < 20% 
FFS vs. 20-80% FFS vs. > 80% FFS ANOVA (F-test) 
Patients per Hour 
Patients per Week During Regular Hours 
Patients per Week During On Call Hours 
Total Patients per Week 
Total Hours per Week 
Practice Size – Female: Solo vs. One 
vs. Two vs. Three vs. Four vs. Five + ANOVA (F-test) 
Patients per Hour 
Patients per Week During Regular Hours 
Patients per Week During On Call Hours 
Total Patients per Week 
Total Hours per Week 
Age – Male: <35 vs. 35-44 vs. 45-54 
vs. 55-65 vs. 65+ ANOVA (F-test) 
Patients per Hour 
Patients per Week During Regular Hours 
Patients per Week During On Call Hours 
Total Patients per Week 
Total Hours per Week 
Payment Method – Male: < 20% FFS 
vs. 20-80% FFS vs. > 80% FFS ANOVA (F-test) 
Patients per Hour 
Patients per Week During Regular Hours 
Patients per Week During On Call Hours 
Total Patients per Week 
Total Hours per Week 
Practice Size – Male: Solo vs. One vs. 
Two vs. Three vs. Four vs. Five + ANOVA (F-test) 
Patients per Hour 
 
3.5.2 Regression Procedures – A Model for GP/FP Output 
 The results of the one way procedures described above will indicate whether or 
not differences in output measures exist on the basis of the characteristics identified in 
the literature and will either support or contradict the claims made within that literature.  
These procedures, however, are not sufficient to quantify the total combined influence 
that those independent variables have on the output of physician services.  An attempt to 
address this question will be made through statistical model building - statistically, how 
much of the variance in the five output measures can be explained by the independent 
variables identified in the literature and measured on the Emerging Issues in the Work of 
Physicians questionnaire?  To what extent do these characteristics contribute to 
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determining the number of patients a GP/FP will see and the number of hours a GP/FP 
will work? 
 Specifically, regression procedures will identify two important phenomena: 1) r² 
values (correlation coefficients) for all of the relationships tested, and 2) regression 
coefficients (b and β).  When an output measure (i.e., total patient visits per week) is 
regressed against an independent variable (i.e., age) the resulting r² value indicates the 
percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by the independent variable.  
In other words, of all the factors that explain differences in physician output, what 
percentage does gender account for? 
 The b value that results from the regression procedure indicates the intercept of 
the relationship between the output variable and the independent output driver.  β 
provides the slope – or strength – of the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables.  The standardized β values enable the researcher to compare the 
effects of different independent variables (gender, age, payment method, and practice 
size) on the dependent (output) variables.  Close attention will be paid to r² and β values 
in the analysis that follows. 
 
3.6 Hypotheses 
 
3.6.1 One Way Comparisons of GP/FP Output 
 The following section presents the hypotheses associated with each of the one-
way analysis of variance procedures described above.  It is structured in terms of each 
independent variable, providing both the null hypothesis (the assumption that the 
independent variable will not significantly affect the dependent variable) and the 
alternative hypothesis.  For the sake of simplicity, only one null and one alternative 
hypothesis are presented for each independent variable – the effect of that variable on 
the general concept of physician output.  As described above, however, this study 
employs five measures of physician output.  For each hypothesis, five tests will be made 
– one for each of the five dependent variables: 1) total patient visits per week; 2) patient 
visits per week during regular hours; 3) patient visits per week during on call hours; 4) 
hours worked per week; 5) patient visits per hour worked. 
 
 31 
Definition of Terms 
 
Let H0 = the null hypothesis  there will be no difference between groups 
Let HA = the alternative hypothesis  based on the literature presented above 
Let µ = mean 
Let i = the ith output measure (i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
Let output measure #1 = Total Patient Visits Per Week 
Let output measure #2 = Patient Visits Per Week During Regular Hours 
Let output measure #3 = Patient Visits Per Week During On Call Hours 
Let output measure #4 = Hours Worked Per Week 
Let output measure #5 = Patient Visits Per Hour Worked 
 
One Way Hypotheses 
1. The Effect of Gender on Output of GP/FP Services 
H0-1: µi-male = µi-female : mean output for male GP/FPs will not differ from mean 
output for female GP/FPs. 
HA-1: µi-male ≠ µi-female : mean output for male GP/FPs will differ from mean 
output for female GP/FPs. 
2. The Effect of Age on Output of Physician Services – Females 
H0-2: µi-<35 = µi-35-44 = µi-45-54 = µi-55-64 = µi-65+: mean output for female GP/FPs 
will not differ on the basis of age. 
HA-2: Not all µ are equal: mean output for female GP/FPs will differ on the basis 
of age. 
3. The Effect of Age on Output of Physician Services – Males 
H0-3: µi-<35 = µi-35-44 = µi-45-54 = µi-55-64 = µi-65+: mean output for male GP/FPs will 
not differ on the basis of age. 
HA-3: Not all µ are equal: mean output for male GP/FPs will differ on the basis of 
age. 
4. The Effect of Payment Method on Output of Physician Services – Females 
H0-4: µi-<20%FFS = µi-20-80%FFS = µi->80%FFS: mean output for female GP/FPs will not 
differ on the basis of payment method. 
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HA-4: Not all µ are equal: mean output for female GP/FPs will differ on the basis 
of payment method. 
5. The Effect of Payment Method on Output of Physician Services – Males 
H0-5: µi-<20%FFS = µi-20-80%FFS = µi->80%FFS: mean output for male GP/FPs will not 
differ on the basis of payment method. 
  HA-5: Not all µ are equal: mean output for male GP/FPs will differ on the basis of 
 payment method. 
6. The Effect of Practice Size on Output of Physician Services - Females 
H0-6: µi-Solo = µi-2 = µi-3 = µi-4 = µi-5+: mean output for female GP/FPs will not 
differ on the basis of group size. 
HA-6: Not all µ are equal: mean output for female GP/FPs will differ on the basis 
of group size. 
7. The Effect of Practice Size on Output of Physician Services – Males 
H0-7: µi-Solo = µi-2 = µi-3 = µi-4 = µi-5+: mean output for female GP/FPs will not 
differ on the basis of group size. 
HA-7: Not all µ are equal: mean output for male GP/FPs will differ on the basis of 
group size. 
 
3.6.2 Regression Techniques 
 
The section of the analysis involving regression techniques, as described above, 
will attempt to determine the contribution of the dependent variables – gender, age, 
payment method, and practice size - in explaining the dependent variable – output.  Prior 
to loading all of the independent variables into one regression model, each will be tested 
against the dependent variable on its own. 
 
Regression Hypotheses 
1. The Contribution of Gender 
Regression equation #1  Y = β0 + β1Gender; where Y will equal all of: total 
patient visits per week; patient visits per week during regular hours; patient visits per 
week during on call hours; hours worked per week; and patient visits per hour. 
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H0-1: B1 = 0: Gender will not significantly contribute to the explanation of variance 
in output. 
HA-1: B1 ≠ 0: Gender will significantly contribute to the explanation of variance in 
output. 
2. The Contribution of Age 
Regression equation #2  Y = β0 + β1Age; where Y will equal all of: total patient 
visits per week; patient visits per week during regular hours; patient visits per week 
during on call hours; hours worked per week; and patient visits per hour. 
H0-2: B1 = 0: Age will not significantly contribute to the explanation of variance in 
output. 
HA-2: B1 ≠ 0: Age will significantly contribute to the explanation of variance in 
output. 
3. The Contribution of Payment Method 
Regression equation #3  Y = β0 + β1Pay; where Y will equal all of: total patient 
visits per week; patient visits per week during regular hours; patient visits per week 
during on call hours; hours worked per week; and patient visits per hour. 
H0-3: B1 = 0: Payment Method will not significantly contribute to the explanation of 
variance in output. 
HA-3: B1 ≠ 0: Payment Method will significantly contribute to the explanation of 
variance in output. 
4. The Contribution of Practice Size 
Regression equation #4  Y = β0 + β1PSize; where Y will equal all of: total patient 
visits per week; patient visits per week during regular hours; patient visits per week 
during on call hours; hours worked per week; and patient visits per hour. 
H0-4: B1 = 0: Practice Size will not significantly contribute to the explanation of 
variance in output. 
HA-4: B1 ≠ 0: Practice Size will significantly contribute to the explanation of variance 
in output. 
5. The Combined Contribution of the Independent Variables 
Regression equation #5  Y = β0 + β1Gender + β2Age + β3Pay + β4PSize; where Y 
will equal all of: total patient visits per week; patient visits per week during regular 
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hours; patient visits per week during on call hours; hours worked per week; and 
patient visits per hour. 
H0-5: B1 = B2 = B3 = B4 = 0: The combined effect of the independent variables 
gender, age, payment method, and practice size will not significantly contribute to 
the explanation of variance in output. 
HA-5: At least one Bi ≠ 0 (i=1,2,3,4): The independent variables gender, age, 
payment method, and practice size will significantly contribute to the explanation of 
variance in the dependent variable output. 
After testing hypothesis #5, tests for reduced models and parsimony were carried 
out.  Some independent variables were insignificant in the combined equation and, as 
such, should not be included in the model for that particular output measure.  These 
were removed to create a more condensed model.  In addition, some independent 
variables were deemed significant, but contributed very little to the overall explanation 
of variance in the output variable.  Following the principle of parsimony, tests were 
carried out to determine whether or not these variables should remain in the equation, or 
be excluded in order to create a model with fewer independent variables.  The test 
statistic for parsimony and best-fit is the Partial F-test: 
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Where SSE1 is the sum of squares error of the reduced model (the model that does not 
contain the independent variable in question), SSE2 is the sum of squares error of the full 
model (the model containing all independent variables), k is the number of independent 
variables being tested for parsimony, and MSE2 is the mean squared error of the full 
model.  The resulting F-value is then compared to a tabulated F-value at Fk,n-p-k-1 where n 
is total degrees of freedom plus one, and p is the number of independent variables in the 
reduced model.  If the calculated F-value is less than the tabulated F-value, it is 
impossible to conclude that the variable in question significantly contributes to 
explaining the variation in the dependent variable.  As such, it should be excluded from 
the model.  After all tests for parsimony were complete and all non-contributors 
removed, the best-fit model remained. 
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3.7 Limitations 
 
3.7.1 Absence of Medical School History 
 
 One of the more significant limitations of this study is its inability to account for 
respondents’ medical school history.  The literature has identified the country of 
graduation as one of the determinants of output in physicians practicing in Canada.  The 
questionnaire from which this study’s data were drawn did not include questions 
regarding medical schools.  The result of this omission is an inability to measure the 
effects of medical school on output; more specifically – do internationally trained 
physicians score higher or lower on the study’s output measures?  The literature 
suggests that International Medical Graduates tend to produce greater levels of output.  
The literature suggests, in addition, that this group of physicians has proportionately 
more male members and tends to be older than the domestically trained group – two 
characteristics that have been found by the literature to increase output.  Nonetheless it 
would have been beneficial to isolate the effects of this phenomenon. 
 
3.7.2 Sample Size 
 
 That statistical power of a cross sectional questionnaire study is inherently 
constrained by the study’s sample size.  The responses to specific questions were used to 
create variables which broke the sample down into groups, sometimes 2 or 3 groups 
(gender and payment method), sometimes more (age, group size).  The further one splits 
the sample, the smaller the number of respondents in each category.  As such, some cells 
may have had an insufficient sample size to find statistical differences that may 
otherwise have been found. 
 In order to examine the statistical power of the analysis, power tests were 
conducted.  While the power levels are presented with the results, the process and 
calculations through which power levels were arrived at are included as Appendix E. 
 
3.7.3 Self-Reported Data 
 
 There are inherent limitations to the use of ‘self-reported data’.  First and 
foremost, a study using this method assumes that participants have sufficient 
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information available to them to provide accurate responses. It assumes, in addition, that 
participants are not fabricating the information that they report.  The questions asked by 
the survey associated with this study require answers that are seemingly within 
respondents’ capacity.  One can also assume that respondents are answering questions in 
good faith.  There remains, however small, a chance that one of these two assumptions 
has been violated. 
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4.0 Results 
 
 The results will be presented in five sections.  Section 4.1 will present the 
distribution of each variable employed by the study, both independent and dependent.  
Section 4.2 will then provide means and standard deviations for each of the same 
variables.  Once the sample has been described in detail, Section 4.3 will present a 
comparative analysis of the output scores for respondents grouped on the basis of 
gender, age, payment method, and practice size.  This will identify actual statistically 
significant differences between groups of GP/FPs.  Section 4.4 then presents regression 
analyses that were conducted to quantify the contribution of each independent variable 
to output of GP/FP services.   
 
4.1 Sample Distributions 
 
 In this section, the sample will be described in terms of each independent and 
then each dependent variable.  Each subsection displays salient information and 
provides an explanation of the data that has been presented. 
 38 
4.1.1 Gender 
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Figure 4.1.1 – Gender Distribution of Sample 
 
 The sample stratification, described in the methodology, resulted in a greater 
number of responses from female GP/FPs (526) than from male GP/FPs (479) – one 
GP/FP declined to report his or her gender.  As such, the duration of the description 
section – and indeed the entire comparative analysis – is presented once for responding 
females and once for responding males, in order to correct for the stratification, which 
misrepresents the actual physician population. 
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4.1.2 Age 
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Figure 4.1.2 – Age Distribution of Sample 
 
 In terms of age distribution, the female sample was concentrated most heavily 
within the 35-54 range - of the 524 responding females, 405 (77%) fell within this 
group.  Just 8 female respondents were over the age of 65, while 65 females were under 
the age of 35.  The male sample displayed more breadth with respect to age than the 
female sample.  Most male respondents (194 or 40.5%) fell within the 45-54 age range.  
Another 127 (26.5%) fell within the 55-64 range, and another 110 (23%) within the 35-
44 group.  The study acquired responses from 28 male physicians 65 years of age or 
older, and just 19 from male physicians below the age of 35.   
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4.1.3 Payment Method 
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Figure 4.1.3 – %FFS Distribution of Sample 
 
 Of the 526 responding female GP/FPs, 372 (70.7%) reported that fee for service 
payments account for over 80% of their total income.  Just 81 (15.4%) females reported 
that FFS income accounted for less than 20% of their income, while 73 (13.9%) of 
female respondents reported a FFS level somewhere between 20 and 80%. 
 Like their female counterparts, the vast majority (319 or 66.6%) of male 
respondents reported a fee for service level above 80% of their total income.  Just 70 
male respondents (14.6%) received 20% or less of their income through fee for service, 
and just 90 (18.8%) reported a level between 20 and 80 per cent. 
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4.1.4 Practice Size 
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Figure 4.1.4 – Practice Size Distribution of Sample 
 
 
 A large number of reported practice sizes for female GP/FPs exceeded four 
physicians.  Practices of five or more physicians accounted for 253 (48.1%) of the 526 
responses.  The remaining female respondents were distributed relatively evenly across 
the rest of the practice size categories. 
 Male respondents were distributed almost identically to their female counterparts 
on the basis of practice size.  Once again, practices of five or more GP/FPs were the 
most common, accounting for 214 (44.7%) of the 478 male respondents.  The remaining 
practice size categories were virtually even, as no more than 2.5 percentage points 
separate any two groups. 
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4.1.5 Total Patient Visits per Week (Total Visits) 
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Figure 4.1.5 – Distribution of Total Weekly Patient Visits 
 
 The distribution of female physicians with respect to their total patient visits per 
week approximated a normal distribution about the 100-124 patients per week level.  Of 
the 526 responding female GP/FPs, 108 (20.5%) reported total visits in the 100-124 
range, the highest total in any one category.  As depicted in Figure 4.5.1, the majority 
(51.4%) of female respondents reported total visits higher than 75, but less than 150.  
Just 8% of female GP/FPs reported total visits lower than 50 patients per week, and just 
15.4% reported fewer than 175 total patients per week. 
 The distribution of responding male GP/FPs also approximated a normal 
distribution, however, the bulk of male GP/FPs reported higher total visits than their 
female counterparts.  Interestingly, the most frequently occurring reported total visits 
categories – 100-124 and 150-175 – were not adjacent.  The 100-124 group contained 80 
respondents, the 125-149 group contained 52 respondents, and the 150-174 group 
contained 102 respondents, the highest level of any category.  Just 14.9% of responding 
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males reported fewer than 100 total visits, while 23.6% reported total visits in excess of 
200 patients per week. 
 
4.1.6 Patient Visits per Week During Regular Hours (Regular Visits) 
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Figure 4.1.6 – Distribution of Weekly Patient Visits – Regular Hours 
 
 Over one quarter (25.3%) of responding female GP/FPs reported regular visits in 
the range of 100-124.  The remaining physicians were concentrated between a regular 
visit load of 50 and one of 174.  Just 9.9% of females reported levels below 50, and 
another 7.5% reported regular visits in excess of 200 patients per week. 
 Once again, male physicians were concentrated at higher output levels than their 
female counterparts.  Almost half (46.2%) of male respondents fell within one of two 
categories: the 100-124 range or the 150-174 range.  The two largest groups were once 
again non-adjacent.  The range in between – 125-149 – accounted for just 43 (9%) of 
physicians, a count comparable to other smaller groups like the 50-74 range (36), the 
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175-199 range (39) and the 200-224 range (48).  Just 17.8% of responding male GP/FPs 
reported fewer than 100 regular visits; another 18.6% reported levels in excess of 200 
patients per week during regular hours. 
 
4.1.7 Patient Visits per Week While On Call (On Call Visits) 
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Figure 4.1.7 – Distribution of Weekly Patient Visits – On Call 
  
 As displayed in Figure 4.1.7, the majority (51.9%) of female respondents 
reported fewer than five on call visits per week.  The 5-9 range and the 10-14 range 
contained 13.9 and 10.1 per cent respectively; all other groups contained fewer than 7% 
of the responding female sample, and accounted for 18.9% when combined. 
 Male respondents were also concentrated below the 5 visits per week mark, but 
their concentration (35.1%) was not as significant as the female sample.  The 5-9 range 
and the 10-14 range accounted for 15.4 and 13.6 per cent of the male sample 
respectively.  No other category accounted for more than 7.5% of responses on its own, 
though 35.9 per cent of male respondents reported on call visits in excess of 15 per 
week. 
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4.1.8 Hours Worked per Week (Hours Worked) 
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Figure 4.1.8 – Distribution of Hours Worked per Week 
 
The distribution of hours worked by female respondents was approximated a 
normal curve.  The largest group, numbering 181 (34.4%) reported a regular workweek 
ranging from 40-49 hours.  Another 22.6% of respondents reported 30-39 hours worked, 
and 19% reported a work week between 50 and 59 hours in length.  Just 14 per cent of 
female respondents worked fewer than 30 hours per week, while 9.7% reported 
workweeks in excess of 60 hours. 
 The hours worked distribution for male respondents is somewhat skewed.  Over 
four fifths of the responding male sample (87.5%) reported work weeks in excess of 40 
hours.  The largest group, the 40-49 range, accounted for 35.7% of male respondents, 
while the 50-59 and 60-69 categories contained 29.6 and 16.7 per cent of the responding 
males respectively.  Over one twentieth (5.4%) of male respondents reported work 
weeks that exceed 70 hours. 
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4.1.9 Patient Visits per Hour (Visits per Hour) 
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Figure 4.1.9 – Distribution of Patient Visits per Hour Worked 
 
 Patient visits per hour for female responding GP/FPs displayed an approximate 
normal distribution.  The largest contingent, the 2.5-3 range, accounted for just under 
one quarter (22.2%) of all responding females.  Respondents were concentrated heavily 
between the 1.5 and the 4 visits per hour mark; this cluster accounted for over three 
quarters (76.4%) of all responding females.  Just 9.1% of respondents reported seeing 
fewer than 1.5 patients per hour, while 14.5% exceeded 4 visits per hour. 
 Male respondents displayed a similar normal distribution to that of their female 
colleagues, although the former were slightly more concentrated toward the upper end of 
the visits per hour scale.  The majority of male respondents (61.3%) conducted between 
2 and 4 visits per hour.  The 2-2.5, 2.5-3, and 3-3.5 ranges were similar, accounting for 
15, 17.5, and 17.1 per cent of the responding male sample respectively.  Just 14.5 per 
cent of responding males reported seeing fewer than two, while 14.9% exceeded 4 visits 
per hour. 
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4.2  Sample Means and Standard Deviations 
 
Table 4.2 – Sample Means and Standard Deviations for Study Variables 
Total Female Male Comparisons (F to M) 
Measure 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Mean 
Std. 
Dev. F-M t-value p-value 
Independent          
Age 47.11 9.27 44.13 8.29 50.39 9.20 -6.26 -11.27 0.000 
Payment (% 
FFS) 78.30 34.51 78.19 35.65 78.37 33.25 -0.18 -0.085 0.932 
Practice Size 5.97 6.68 6.22 7.07 5.69 6.22 0.53 1.250 0.211 
Dependent          
Total Visits 138.04 61.94 120.69 54.42 157.15 64.18 
Regular 
Visits 124.70 56.30 109.23 49.58 141.70 58.41 
On Call 
Visits 13.41 21.40 11.47 20.33 15.57 22.35 
Hours 
Worked 45.06 12.35 41.20 12.09 49.33 11.20 
Visits per 
Hour 3.11 1.27 3.00 1.24 3.24 1.29 
Conducted in Section 4.3.1 
 
4.2.1 Independent Variables 
 The average reported age of female respondents was 44.13 years, compared to 
50.39 years for their male colleagues.  As evidenced by the standard deviations 
presented in Table 4.2, the age of male respondents was slightly more variable than that 
of their female counterparts.  From a statistical standpoint, the t-test conducted revealed 
that the age difference between male and female respondents was statistically 
significant. 
 Responding female and male GP/FPs reported virtually identical means with 
respect to the percentage of their remuneration collected through fee for service billings.  
Both groups reported a mean percentage just over 78% and displayed roughly the same 
variation.  The t-test conducted found no statistically significant difference between 
genders on the basis of payment method. 
 In terms of practice size, female respondents reported a mean slightly higher than 
that of their male colleagues.  Female respondents reported an average practice size of 
6.22 physicians, while males reported an average size of 5.69 physicians.  Variability, as 
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measured by the standard deviations presented, was similar between the two genders, 
though the female figure was slightly higher.  The t-test conducted could not conclude 
the difference in reported practice size between genders was statistically significant. 
 
4.2.2 Dependent Variables 
 Male respondents within the sample reported a higher mean score than their 
female colleagues with respect to total visits.  Female physicians reported a mean score 
of 120.69 total visits, roughly 37 visits fewer than males, whose mean score was 157.15.  
Male physicians displayed more variability in total visits as evidenced by the standard 
deviations displayed above. 
 The apparent output discrepancies between the genders were even more apparent 
when one appeals to the regular visits measure.  Male respondents averaged 141.70 
regular visits, more than 30 visits higher than the 109.23 mean reported by their female 
colleagues.  Once again male GP/FP respondents displayed more variability than 
females.  Continuing the trend, males once again reported higher output levels as 
measured by on call visits.  Male GP/FPs report average 15.57 weekly patient visits 
while on call, while females report 11.47 patient visits.  Once again, responses from 
male GP/FPs were slightly more variable than those of their female colleagues. 
 Male respondents also reported higher mean hours worked than their female 
counterparts.  The average male respondent reported an average workweek of 49.33 
hours, compared to the 41.2 hour workweek reported by the collective female sample.  
Unlike other output measures, females were slightly more variable in their hours worked 
per week than their male colleagues. 
 With respect to the final measure examined in this study – patient visits per hour 
worked – male respondents once again reported higher levels of output than their female 
colleagues.  Male GP/FPs reported an average of 3.24 patients per hour compared to 
3.00 patients for females; variability was virtually identical.  
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4.3  Comparative Analyses 
 
 The effect of each independent variable on each output measure is presented 
below.  A pictorial representation precedes a series of tables for each independent 
variable and an explanation of the results.  The pictorial representations - or ‘Figures’ as 
labeled below - are included in order to present trends in the data.  Differences between 
groups that appear to exist in the Figures should be confirmed in the corresponding 
Tables, which provide actual statistical differences based on the analyses of variance and 
t-tests.  Significant differences (p <= 0.05) are bolded. 
 
4.3.1 The Effect of Gender on Measures of GP/FP Output 
Workload by Gender - All GP/FPs
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Figure 4.3.1 – The Effect of Gender on GP/FP Output of Services 
  
 Figure 4.3.1 presents mean scores for males and females for each of the five 
output measures.  In each case, males reported higher output levels than their female 
colleagues.  Female respondents reported 23% fewer total visits and regular visits than 
their male colleagues.  Females also reported 26% fewer on call visits, worked 16% 
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fewer hours, and reported 8% fewer visits per hour.  Table 4.3.1 presents the statistical 
significance of these differences. 
 
Table 4.3.1 – The Effect of Gender on GP/FP Output of Services 
Mean STD Mean STD
Total Patients 120.69 54.42 157.15 64.18 -36.46 -9.652 0.000 59.26 3.23 1.00
Patients During 
Regular Hours 109.23 49.58 141.70 58.41 -32.47 -9.444 0.000 53.96 3.34 1.00
Patients During 
Oncall 11.47 20.33 15.57 22.35 -4.10 -3.033 0.002 21.31 3.01 1.00
Hours Per Week 41.20 12.09 49.33 11.20 -8.13 -11.063 0.000 11.68 7.73 1.00
Patients Per Hour 3.00 1.24 3.24 1.29 -0.24 -2.995 0.003 1.26 12.27 1.00
Power
t-test - Gender vs. Output
ZbetaFemale (N=526) Male (N=477) Pooled STDMeasure
Gender Mean Dif. 
(F-M) t-value
p-value 
(sig.)
 
The ‘Mean Difference’ column presents the mean score from males subtracted 
from the mean score for females.  In every case, the value is negative, indicating a 
higher output level for males than females on every output measure employed.  The 
reader should not compare the mean differences to one another, as the measures are 
presented with different units (patients per week vs. hours per week vs. patients per 
hour). 
 The analyses found, in all measured output categories without exception, the 
mean output scores for male GP/FPs were significantly higher than those for their 
female counterparts.  In the case of all output variables the t-test produced highly 
significant p-values, all of them below 0.005.  These findings were sufficient to reject 
the null hypothesis and conclude that reported output of physician services differed 
between male and female GP/FPs. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 51 
4.3.2 The Effects of Age on GP/FP Output 
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Figure 4.3.2a – The Effect of Age on Output for Female GP/FPs 
 
 Trends with regard to the effect of age on output for female respondents (see 
Figure 4.3.2a) suggest output is highest for physicians within the 45-54 and 55-64 age 
groups.  Reported output for respondents within the youngest bracket (< 35) appears to 
be relatively similar to that reported by GP/FPs in the 35-44 group, while physicians 
over 65 years old reported output levels that were substantially lower than their 
colleagues in all other age categories.  With the exception of on call visits, where the 
youngest GP/FPs were most active, respondents in the 55-64 group reported the highest 
levels of output.  Visits per hour were relatively similar, though the 55-64 group 
reported the highest level while the 65+ group reported the lowest.  The statistical 
significance of these apparent trends is presented in Table 4.3.2a below.
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Table 4.3.2a – The Effect of Age on Output for Female GP/FPs 
 
 
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 35 65 117.37 50.27 35 - 44 210 111.31 50.05 6.06 0.959 50.10 2876.31 0.11 0.05 0.52
< 35 65 117.37 50.27 45 - 54 195 129.01 58.75 -11.64 0.681 56.76 2876.31 -0.22 1.35 0.09
< 35 65 117.37 50.27 55 - 64 46 140.00 52.21 -22.63 0.310 51.08 2876.31 -0.42 2.71 1.00
< 35 65 117.37 50.27 65 + 8 82.75 46.56 34.62 0.564 49.92 2876.31 0.65 3.97 1.00
35 - 44 210 111.31 50.05 45 - 54 195 129.01 58.75 -17.70 0.028 54.41 2876.31 -0.33 4.59 1.00
35 - 44 210 111.31 50.05 55 - 64 46 140.00 52.21 -28.69 0.030 50.44 2876.31 -0.53 7.14 1.00
35 - 44 210 111.31 50.05 65 + 8 82.75 46.56 28.56 0.702 49.94 2876.31 0.53 6.48 1.00
45 - 54 195 129.01 58.75 55 - 64 46 140.00 52.21 -10.99 0.815 57.58 2876.31 -0.20 1.00 0.84
45 - 54 195 129.01 58.75 65 + 8 82.75 46.56 46.26 0.223 58.37 2876.31 0.86 9.33 1.00
55 - 64 46 140.00 52.21 65 + 8 82.75 46.56 57.25 0.102 51.49 2876.31 1.07 6.21 1.00
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 35 65 100.98 42.39 35 - 44 210 101.15 46.34 -0.17 1.000 45.44 2373.82 0.00 -1.90 0.03
< 35 65 100.98 42.39 45 - 54 195 116.86 53.62 -15.88 0.271 51.07 2373.82 -0.33 3.05 1.00
< 35 65 100.98 42.39 55 - 64 46 130.78 46.29 -29.80 0.040 44.04 2373.82 -0.61 5.17 1.00
< 35 65 100.98 42.39 65 + 8 78.13 44.72 22.85 0.814 42.63 2373.82 0.47 2.62 1.00
35 - 44 210 101.15 46.34 45 - 54 195 116.86 53.62 -15.71 0.340 49.98 2373.82 -0.32 4.37 1.00
35 - 44 210 101.15 46.34 55 - 64 46 130.78 46.29 -29.63 0.008 46.33 2373.82 -0.61 8.27 1.00
35 - 44 210 101.15 46.34 65 + 8 78.13 44.72 23.02 0.787 46.29 2373.82 0.47 5.38 1.00
45 - 54 195 116.86 53.62 55 - 64 46 130.78 46.29 -13.92 0.552 52.32 2373.82 -0.29 2.17 0.99
45 - 54 195 116.86 53.62 65 + 8 78.13 44.72 38.73 0.304 53.34 2373.82 0.79 8.39 1.00
55 - 64 46 130.78 46.29 65 + 8 78.13 44.72 52.65 0.095 46.08 2373.82 1.08 6.44 1.00
Zbeta PowerSig. Pooled Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d
The Effects of Age on Regular Visits for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
The Effects of Age on Total Visits for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif.
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Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 35 65 16.38 23.77 35 - 44 210 10.17 18.77 6.21 0.326 20.05 412.62 0.31 3.18 1.00
< 35 65 16.38 23.77 45 - 54 195 12.15 21.81 4.23 0.715 22.31 412.62 0.21 1.10 0.84
< 35 65 16.38 23.77 55 - 64 46 9.22 16.15 7.16 0.501 20.96 412.62 0.35 1.64 0.95
< 35 65 16.38 23.77 65 + 8 4.63 6.55 11.75 0.665 22.66 412.62 0.58 2.47 0.99
35 - 44 210 10.17 18.77 45 - 54 195 12.15 21.81 -1.98 0.915 20.29 412.62 -0.10 0.00 0.50
35 - 44 210 10.17 18.77 55 - 64 46 9.22 16.15 0.95 0.999 18.33 412.62 0.05 -1.13 0.13
35 - 44 210 10.17 18.77 65 + 8 4.63 6.55 5.54 0.966 18.50 412.62 0.27 2.46 0.99
45 - 54 195 12.15 21.81 55 - 64 46 9.22 16.15 2.93 0.941 20.86 412.62 0.14 0.22 0.59
45 - 54 195 12.15 21.81 65 + 8 4.63 6.55 7.52 0.901 21.46 412.62 0.37 3.03 1.00
55 - 64 46 9.22 16.15 65 + 8 4.63 6.55 4.59 0.986 15.21 412.62 0.23 0.26 0.61
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 35 65 39.85 10.81 35 - 44 210 39.12 13.19 0.73 0.996 12.67 141.39 0.06 -1.00 0.16
< 35 65 39.85 10.81 45 - 54 195 43.27 11.23 -3.42 0.401 11.13 141.39 -0.29 3.00 1.00
< 35 65 39.85 10.81 55 - 64 46 45.11 9.12 -5.26 0.262 10.15 141.39 -0.44 3.50 1.00
< 35 65 39.85 10.81 65 + 8 32.38 13.76 7.47 0.590 11.14 141.39 0.63 3.77 1.00
35 - 44 210 39.12 13.19 45 - 54 195 43.27 11.23 -4.15 0.016 12.29 141.39 -0.35 4.84 1.00
35 - 44 210 39.12 13.19 55 - 64 46 45.11 9.12 -5.99 0.050 12.57 141.39 -0.50 5.67 1.00
35 - 44 210 39.12 13.19 65 + 8 32.38 13.76 6.74 0.648 13.21 141.39 0.57 5.57 1.00
45 - 54 195 43.27 11.23 55 - 64 46 45.11 9.12 -1.84 0.926 10.86 141.39 -0.15 0.67 0.75
45 - 54 195 43.27 11.23 65 + 8 32.38 13.76 10.89 0.170 11.33 141.39 0.92 11.74 1.00
55 - 64 46 45.11 9.12 65 + 8 32.38 13.76 12.73 0.100 9.87 141.39 1.07 7.52 1.00
PowerPooled Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta
The Effects of Age on Hours Worked for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
The Effects of Age on On Call Visits for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
 
54
 
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 35 65 3.04 1.22 35 - 44 210 2.96 1.17 0.08 0.996 1.18 1.55 0.06 -0.84 0.20
< 35 65 3.04 1.22 45 - 54 195 3.02 1.36 0.02 1.000 1.33 1.55 0.02 -1.72 0.04
< 35 65 3.04 1.22 55 - 64 46 3.15 1.16 -0.11 0.994 1.20 1.55 -0.09 -0.99 0.16
< 35 65 3.04 1.22 65 + 8 2.45 0.61 0.59 0.808 1.17 1.55 0.47 2.33 0.99
35 - 44 210 2.96 1.17 45 - 54 195 3.02 1.36 -0.06 0.992 1.27 1.55 -0.05 -1.01 0.16
35 - 44 210 2.96 1.17 55 - 64 46 3.15 1.16 -0.19 0.927 1.17 1.55 -0.15 0.64 0.74
35 - 44 210 2.96 1.17 65 + 8 2.45 0.61 0.51 0.860 1.16 1.55 0.41 4.55 1.00
45 - 54 195 3.02 1.36 55 - 64 46 3.15 1.16 -0.13 0.984 1.32 1.55 -0.10 -0.44 0.33
45 - 54 195 3.02 1.36 65 + 8 2.45 0.61 0.57 0.800 1.34 1.55 0.46 4.10 1.00
55 - 64 46 3.15 1.16 65 + 8 2.45 0.61 0.70 0.704 1.10 1.55 0.56 2.71 1.00
PowerPooled Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
The Effects of Age on Visits per Hour for Female Physicians
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 Table 4.3.2a presents the mean scores for the effects of age on female GP/FP 
output of services.  The analysis confirmed that significant differences in total visits, 
regular visits, and hours worked exist between females within different age groups.  The 
apparent differences in on call visits and visits per hour were not confirmed.  The 
analysis identified differences in total visits, regular visits, and hours worked between 
the 65+ group and the two immediately younger groups (45-54, 55-64).  No other 
differences could be confirmed as statistically significant by the analysis. 
45
50
150
128
120
46
3.5
159
145
14
144
164
20
50
3.3
3.2
138
155
17
12
161
49
3.3
2.9
8
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
Total Patients Patients During Regular
Hours
Patients During Oncall Hours Per Week Patients Per Hour
Workload Measure
< 35 (19)
35 - 44 (110)
45 - 54 (194)
55 - 64 (125)
65 + (28)
 
Figure 4.3.2b – The Effect of Age on Output for Male GP/FPs 
 
 The trend presentation provided in Figure 4.3.2b suggests the effects of age on 
output of GP/FP services may not be as pronounced for males as for females.  In each 
volume output measure, males in the 65+ age group reported substantially lower levels 
of output than their colleagues in other age categories.  The upward trend at the lower 
end of the age scale that was present with female physicians was not as apparent with 
males.  Males in the 35-44 age group reported the highest levels of total visits and on 
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call visits, but reported fewer regular visits than the 55-64 group and almost identical 
regular visits to the <35 group.   
 In terms of reported hours worked, males in all age groups were relatively 
similar: the highest groups (34-44, 45-54) reported 50 hours per week, and the lowest 
(<35) reported 45 hours per week.  The visits per hour values were also quite similar, 
though appeared to fall as age increased.  Table 4.3.2b below presents the statistical 
significance of these trends.
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Table 4.3.2b – The Effect of Age on Output for Male GP/FPs 
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 35 19 158.79 52.47 35 - 44 110 163.68 68.19 -4.89 0.999 66.19 4090.34 -0.08 -1.12 0.13
< 35 19 158.79 52.47 45 - 54 193 155.41 59.36 3.38 1.000 58.80 4090.34 0.05 -1.12 0.13
< 35 19 158.79 52.47 55 - 64 125 161.34 67.21 -2.55 1.000 65.53 4090.34 -0.04 -1.49 0.07
< 35 19 158.79 52.47 65 + 28 128.11 68.93 30.68 0.626 62.87 4090.34 0.48 1.39 0.92
35 - 44 110 163.68 68.19 45 - 54 193 155.41 59.36 8.27 0.864 62.70 4090.34 0.13 0.34 0.63
35 - 44 110 163.68 68.19 55 - 64 125 161.34 67.21 2.34 0.999 67.67 4090.34 0.04 -1.43 0.08
35 - 44 110 163.68 68.19 65 + 28 128.11 68.93 35.57 0.143 68.34 4090.34 0.56 4.15 1.00
45 - 54 193 155.41 59.36 55 - 64 125 161.34 67.21 -5.93 0.947 62.56 4090.34 -0.09 -0.27 0.39
45 - 54 193 155.41 59.36 65 + 28 128.11 68.93 27.30 0.363 60.62 4090.34 0.43 4.73 1.00
55 - 64 125 161.34 67.21 65 + 28 128.11 68.93 33.23 0.188 67.52 4090.34 0.52 4.13 1.00
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 35 19 145.26 54.10 35 - 44 110 143.62 60.65 1.64 1.000 59.77 3394.30 0.03 -1.65 0.05
< 35 19 145.26 54.10 45 - 54 193 138.74 55.41 6.52 0.993 55.30 3394.30 0.11 -0.24 0.41
< 35 19 145.26 54.10 55 - 64 125 149.66 59.31 -4.40 0.999 58.68 3394.30 -0.08 -1.06 0.14
< 35 19 145.26 54.10 65 + 28 120.39 65.52 24.87 0.724 61.21 3394.30 0.43 0.83 0.80
35 - 44 110 143.62 60.65 45 - 54 193 138.74 55.41 4.88 0.968 57.36 3394.30 0.08 -0.48 0.32
35 - 44 110 143.62 60.65 55 - 64 125 149.66 59.31 -6.04 0.960 59.94 3394.30 -0.10 -0.42 0.34
35 - 44 110 143.62 60.65 65 + 28 120.39 65.52 23.23 0.472 61.65 3394.30 0.40 2.47 0.99
45 - 54 193 138.74 55.41 55 - 64 125 149.66 59.31 -10.92 0.588 56.97 3394.30 -0.19 1.46 0.93
45 - 54 193 138.74 55.41 65 + 28 120.39 65.52 18.35 0.673 56.75 3394.30 0.31 2.85 1.00
55 - 64 125 149.66 59.31 65 + 28 120.39 65.52 29.27 0.218 60.47 3394.30 0.50 4.03 1.00
The Effects of Age on Total Visits for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
Sig. Pooled Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
The Effects of Age on Regular Visits for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif.
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Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 35 19 13.53 19.30 35 - 44 110 20.06 25.11 -6.53 0.843 24.37 492.74 -0.29 1.08 0.86
< 35 19 13.53 19.30 45 - 54 193 16.68 23.68 -3.15 0.988 23.34 492.74 -0.14 0.01 0.50
< 35 19 13.53 19.30 55 - 64 125 11.67 18.29 1.86 1.000 18.42 492.74 0.08 -0.75 0.23
< 35 19 13.53 19.30 65 + 28 7.71 11.63 5.82 0.942 15.17 492.74 0.26 0.67 0.75
35 - 44 110 20.06 25.11 45 - 54 193 16.68 23.68 3.38 0.790 24.21 492.74 0.15 0.47 0.68
35 - 44 110 20.06 25.11 55 - 64 125 11.67 18.29 8.39 0.119 21.75 492.74 0.38 3.95 1.00
35 - 44 110 20.06 25.11 65 + 28 7.71 11.63 12.35 0.143 23.07 492.74 0.56 4.33 1.00
45 - 54 193 16.68 23.68 55 - 64 125 11.67 18.29 5.01 0.555 21.72 492.74 0.23 2.15 0.98
45 - 54 193 16.68 23.68 65 + 28 7.71 11.63 8.97 0.417 22.55 492.74 0.40 3.95 1.00
55 - 64 125 11.67 18.29 65 + 28 7.71 11.63 3.96 0.919 17.29 492.74 0.18 0.87 0.81
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 35 19 44.95 5.02 35 - 44 110 50.24 11.12 -5.29 0.460 10.47 124.94 -0.47 3.78 1.00
< 35 19 44.95 5.02 45 - 54 193 49.65 10.44 -4.70 0.562 10.09 124.94 -0.42 4.82 1.00
< 35 19 44.95 5.02 55 - 64 125 49.56 10.86 -4.61 0.610 10.30 124.94 -0.41 3.41 1.00
< 35 19 44.95 5.02 65 + 28 45.93 18.64 -0.98 0.999 14.78 124.94 -0.09 -1.51 0.07
35 - 44 110 50.24 11.12 45 - 54 193 49.65 10.44 0.59 0.993 10.69 124.94 0.05 -1.00 0.16
35 - 44 110 50.24 11.12 55 - 64 125 49.56 10.86 0.68 0.991 10.98 124.94 0.06 -1.01 0.16
35 - 44 110 50.24 11.12 65 + 28 45.93 18.64 4.31 0.507 12.96 124.94 0.39 1.95 0.97
45 - 54 193 49.65 10.44 55 - 64 125 49.56 10.86 0.09 0.100 10.61 124.94 0.01 -1.81 0.04
45 - 54 193 49.65 10.44 65 + 28 45.93 18.64 3.72 0.625 11.76 124.94 0.33 2.74 1.00
55 - 64 125 49.56 10.86 65 + 28 45.93 18.64 3.63 0.682 12.61 124.94 0.32 1.60 0.95
The Effects of Age on On Call Visits for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
The Effects of Age on Hours Worked for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
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Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 35 19 3.53 1.09 35 - 44 110 3.31 1.36 0.22 0.977 1.33 1.66 0.17 -0.07 0.47
< 35 19 3.53 1.09 45 - 54 193 3.22 1.26 0.31 0.901 1.25 1.66 0.24 1.66 0.95
< 35 19 3.53 1.09 55 - 64 125 3.26 1.29 0.27 0.950 1.27 1.66 0.21 0.60 0.73
< 35 19 3.53 1.09 65 + 28 2.88 1.37 0.65 0.586 1.27 1.66 0.50 1.56 0.94
35 - 44 110 3.31 1.36 45 - 54 193 3.22 1.26 0.09 0.980 1.30 1.66 0.07 -0.75 0.23
35 - 44 110 3.31 1.36 55 - 64 125 3.26 1.29 0.05 0.999 1.32 1.66 0.04 -1.38 0.08
35 - 44 110 3.31 1.36 65 + 28 2.88 1.37 0.43 0.655 1.36 1.66 0.33 1.75 0.96
45 - 54 193 3.22 1.26 55 - 64 125 3.26 1.29 -0.04 0.998 1.27 1.66 -0.03 -1.40 0.08
45 - 54 193 3.22 1.26 65 + 28 2.88 1.37 0.34 0.814 1.27 1.66 0.26 2.01 0.98
55 - 64 125 3.26 1.29 65 + 28 2.88 1.37 0.38 0.741 1.30 1.66 0.29 1.64 0.95
The Effects of Age on Visits per Hour for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig. Power
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta
 60 
 Table 4.3.2b presents the mean scores for the effects of age on male GP/FP 
output of services.  The analysis could not confirm any of the apparent differences 
presented in Figure 4.3.2b for any of the output measures.  Despite notable differences 
in mean scores, none of the null hypotheses could be rejected for male respondents on 
the basis of age. 
 
4.3.3 The Effects of Payment Method on GP/FP Output 
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Figure 4.3.3a – The Effect of Payment Method on Output for Female GP/FPs  
 
 The trends uncovered in the analysis with regard to the effect of payment method 
(see Figure 4.3.3a) suggest differences in output levels exist between physicians who are 
remunerated through different schemes.  Female respondents who received less than 
20% of their remuneration through fee for service (FFS) payments reported 30% fewer 
total visits than their colleagues who received at least 80% FFS, and 25% fewer than 
those who received 20%-80% FFS.  The differences were even more substantial (36% 
and 27%) with regard to the regular visits measure. 
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 In contrast, payment method did not substantially affect on call visits or hours 
worked.  It did, however, appear to influence the number of patient visits a female 
respondent conducts over the course of an hour – more FFS remuneration seems was 
associated with higher throughput rates.  The statistical significance of these trends are 
presented in Table 4.3.3a below. 
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Table 4.3.3a – The Effect of Payment Method on Output for Female GP/FPs 
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 20% FFS 81 89.07 44.47 20-80% FFS 73 117.59 52.79 -28.52 0.004 48.59 276.31 -1.72 5.32 1.00
< 20% FFS 81 89.07 44.47 >80% FFS 370 128.28 54.41 -39.21 0.000 52.78 276.31 -2.36 13.78 1.00
20-80% FFS 73 117.59 52.79 >80% FFS 370 128.28 54.41 -10.69 0.292 54.15 276.31 -0.64 2.19 0.99
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 20% FFS 81 76.28 33.32 20-80% FFS 73 103.56 45.32 -27.28 0.002 39.46 2246.71 -0.58 6.62 1.00
< 20% FFS 81 76.28 33.32 >80% FFS 370 117.55 50.42 -41.27 0.000 47.82 2246.71 -0.87 16.33 1.00
20-80% FFS 73 103.56 45.32 >80% FFS 370 117.55 50.42 -13.99 0.072 49.62 2246.71 -0.30 3.96 1.00
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 20% FFS 81 12.79 23.84 20-80% FFS 73 14.03 21.48 -1.24 0.931 22.75 413.35 -0.06 -1.28 0.10
< 20% FFS 81 12.79 23.84 >80% FFS 370 10.73 19.29 2.06 0.698 20.18 413.35 0.10 0.20 0.58
20-80% FFS 73 14.03 21.48 >80% FFS 370 10.73 19.29 3.30 0.437 19.66 413.35 0.16 1.56 0.94
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 20% FFS 81 42.27 12.16 20-80% FFS 73 42.37 11.42 -0.10 0.999 11.82 146.11 -0.01 -1.85 0.03
< 20% FFS 81 42.27 12.16 >80% FFS 370 40.71 12.21 1.56 0.584 12.20 146.11 0.13 0.75 0.77
20-80% FFS 73 42.37 11.42 >80% FFS 370 40.71 12.21 1.66 0.572 12.08 146.11 0.14 0.92 0.82
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
The Effects of Payment Method on Total Visits for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Power
The Effects of Payment Method on On Call Visits for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta
The Effects of Payment Method on Hours Worked for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta
Power
The Effects of Payment Method on Regular Visits for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2
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Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 20% FFS 81 2.16 0.99 20-80% FFS 73 2.88 1.28 -0.72 0.001 1.14 1.40 -0.61 5.90 1.00
< 20% FFS 81 2.16 0.99 >80% FFS 370 3.21 1.20 -1.05 0.000 1.17 1.40 -0.89 17.13 1.00
20-80% FFS 73 2.88 1.28 >80% FFS 370 3.21 1.20 -0.33 0.111 1.21 1.40 -0.28 3.75 1.00
PowerPooled Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta
The Effects of Payment Method on Visits per Hour for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
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 The results of the one way analyses (Table 4.3.2a) confirm the trends apparent in 
Figure 4.3.3a.  Female respondents in the <20% FFS group conducted significantly 
fewer total visits, and regular visits than respondents who were remunerated more 
substantially through FFS.  The same group conducted significantly fewer visits per 
hour than the other two groups.  No differences between any groups were found on the 
basis of on call visits or hours worked.  The analysis was also unable to confirm 
statistically significant differences between the > 80% FFS group and the 20-80% FFS 
group, despite substantial differences in reported mean output levels in several 
categories.
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Figure 4.3.3b – The Effect of Payment Method on Output for Male GP/FPs  
 
 The trends with respect to the effect of payment method on output for male 
GP/FPs (Figure 4.3.3b) appear to follow those for females.  Once again, respondents in 
the <20% FFS group reported substantially lower mean output levels than respondents 
in the 20-80% group and the >80% group.  Those remunerated least through FFS 
reported 50 fewer total visits and 51 fewer regular visits than their colleagues in the 
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>80% group.  The former also reported conducting 30 fewer total visits and 26 fewer 
regular visits than respondents in the 20-80% group. 
 Once again, differences in on call visits and hours worked did not vary 
substantially between groups, though respondents in the 20-80% FFS group reported 
slightly higher on call visits than respondents in the other two groups.  The visits per 
hour measure for males followed the trend of their female colleagues – a higher 
percentage of FFS appears to have led to faster patient throughput.  The statistical 
significance of these apparent trends is presented in Table 4.3.3b below. 
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Table 4.3.3b – The Effect of Payment Method on Output for Male GP/FPs 
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 20% FFS 70 118.2 51.96 20-80% FFS 90 147.92 60.85 -29.72 0.011 57.14 3812.13 -0.48 4.62 1.00
< 20% FFS 70 118.2 51.96 >80% FFS 317 168.37 63.92 -50.17 0.000 61.95 3812.13 -0.81 13.93 1.00
20-80% FFS 90 147.92 60.85 >80% FFS 317 168.37 63.92 -20.45 0.022 63.26 3812.13 -0.33 4.55 1.00
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 20% FFS 70 103.21 39.24 20-80% FFS 90 129.14 48.69 -25.93 0.014 44.81 3079.13 -0.47 5.36 1.00
< 20% FFS 70 103.21 39.24 >80% FFS 317 153.77 60.13 -50.56 0.000 56.95 3079.13 -0.91 15.46 1.00
20-80% FFS 90 129.14 48.69 >80% FFS 317 153.77 60.13 -24.63 0.001 57.81 3079.13 -0.44 6.61 1.00
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 20% FFS 70 14.99 26.47 20-80% FFS 90 18.78 28.92 -3.79 0.568 27.88 499.39 -0.17 -0.24 0.05
< 20% FFS 70 14.99 26.47 >80% FFS 317 14.60 18.72 0.39 0.998 20.33 499.39 0.02 -1.58 0.06
20-80% FFS 90 18.78 28.92 >80% FFS 317 14.60 18.72 4.18 0.328 21.38 499.39 0.19 1.97 0.98
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 20% FFS 70 46.56 9.77 20-80% FFS 90 49.94 10.60 -3.38 0.165 10.25 124.73 -0.30 2.21 0.99
< 20% FFS 70 46.56 9.77 >80% FFS 317 49.80 11.63 -3.24 0.096 11.32 124.73 -0.29 3.66 1.00
20-80% FFS 90 49.94 10.60 >80% FFS 317 49.80 11.63 0.14 0.990 11.41 124.73 0.01
-1.71 0.04
The Effects of Payment Method on Total Visits for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
The Effects of Payment Method on Regular Visits for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
The Effects of Payment Method on On Call Visits for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
Power
The Effects of Payment Method on Hours Worked for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta
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Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
< 20% FFS 70 2.61 1.15 20-80% FFS 90 3.01 1.25 -0.40 0.131 1.21 1.57 -0.32 2.23 0.99
< 20% FFS 70 2.61 1.15 >80% FFS 317 3.44 1.28 -0.83 0.000 1.26 1.57 -0.66 10.99 1.00
20-80% FFS 90 3.01 1.25 >80% FFS 317 3.44 1.28 -0.43 0.017 1.27 1.57 -0.34 4.84 1.00
The Effects of Payment Method on Visits per Hour for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Zbeta PowerSig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d
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 Table 4.3.3b confirms many of the trends suggested in Figure 4.3.3b.  With 
respect to total visits, regular visits, and visits per hour, male respondents in all three 
payment categories differed significantly from one another.  As fee for service 
remuneration increased, output as measured by these three variables also increased.  In 
addition, respondents who received less than 20% of their remuneration through fee for 
service reported fewer hours worked than their colleagues who received a greater 
percentage of FFS.  There was no difference in hours worked, however, between the 20-
80% group and the >80% group. 
 
4.3.4 The Effect of Practice Size on GP/FP Output 
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Figure 4.3.4a – The Effect of Practice Size on Output for Female GP/FPs 
 
 The analysis also suggested trends with regard to the effect of practice size on 
output.  Mean output scores for female GP/FPs (Figure 4.3.4a) seemed to be associated 
with the number of physicians in the practice.  For the total visits and regular visits 
measures, levels of output appeared to drop as the number of physicians increased.  
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Specifically, scores started at 143 total visits and 135 regular visits for solo practitioners 
and declined steadily to 113 total visits and 100 regular visits for physicians who 
practiced in groups of five or more.  The most notable decrease was between solo 
practice respondents and respondents who practiced with one partner.  Differences were 
less substantial between respondents who practiced with at least two other physicians. 
 The remaining three measures of output were not substantially associated with 
the number of physicians in the practice.  With regard to on call visits there appeared to 
be a slight upward trend as the number of physicians increased.  Of responding female 
GP/FPs, solo practitioners reported the most hours worked, but the remaining four 
groups reported almost identical means.  Visits per hour scores appear almost identical 
for all groups.  Table 4.3.4a below presents the statistical validity of these trends. 
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Table 4.3.4a – The Effect of Practice Size on Output for Female GP/FPs 
 
 
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
Solo 63 144.05 68.30 Two 71 125.21 56.17 18.84 0.430 62.16 2889.71 0.35 1.55 0.94
Solo 63 144.05 68.30 Three 79 123.01 51.62 21.04 0.282 59.59 2889.71 0.39 2.25 0.99
Solo 63 144.05 68.30 Four 59 119.71 48.69 24.34 0.205 59.63 2889.71 0.45 2.55 0.99
Solo 63 144.05 68.30 Five + 252 113.17 50.82 30.88 0.003 54.73 2889.71 0.57 8.05 1.00
Two 71 125.21 56.17 Three 79 123.01 51.62 2.20 1.000 53.82 2889.71 0.04 -1.46 0.07
Two 71 125.21 56.17 Four 59 119.71 48.69 5.50 0.987 52.91 2889.71 0.10 -0.77 0.22
Two 71 125.21 56.17 Five + 252 113.17 50.82 12.04 0.597 52.03 2889.71 0.22 2.20 0.99
Three 79 123.01 51.62 Four 59 119.71 48.69 3.30 0.998 50.39 2889.71 0.06 -1.19 0.12
Three 79 123.01 51.62 Five + 252 113.17 50.82 9.84 0.734 51.01 2889.71 0.18 1.55 0.94
Four 59 119.71 48.69 Five + 252 113.17 50.82 6.54 0.951 50.43 2889.71 0.12 0.33 0.63
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
Solo 63 135.24 63.47 Two 71 115.65 52.97 19.59 0.268 58.14 2344.45 0.40 1.94 0.97
Solo 63 135.24 63.47 Three 79 114.91 50.07 20.33 0.209 56.40 2344.45 0.42 2.34 0.99
Solo 63 135.24 63.47 Four 59 106.05 39.86 29.19 0.031 53.38 2344.45 0.60 4.08 1.00
Solo 63 135.24 63.47 Five + 252 99.87 44.00 35.37 0.000 48.48 2344.45 0.73 10.99 1.00
Two 71 115.65 52.97 Three 79 114.91 50.07 0.74 1.000 51.46 2344.45 0.02 -1.78 0.04
Two 71 115.65 52.97 Four 59 106.05 39.86 9.60 0.867 47.48 2344.45 0.20 0.35 0.64
Two 71 115.65 52.97 Five + 252 99.87 44.00 15.78 0.214 46.11 2344.45 0.33 4.19 1.00
Three 79 114.91 50.07 Four 59 106.05 39.86 8.86 0.889 45.99 2344.45 0.18 0.30 0.62
Three 79 114.91 50.07 Five + 252 99.87 44.00 15.04 0.220 45.51 2344.45 0.31 4.05 1.00
Four 59 106.05 39.86 Five + 252 99.87 44.00 6.18 0.944 43.25 2344.45 0.13 0.56 0.71
Zbeta PowerSig. Pooled Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d
The Effects of Group Size on Regular Visits for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
The Effects of Group Size on Total Visits for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif.
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Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
Solo 63 8.81 16.25 Two 71 9.56 13.23 -0.75 0.999 14.73 411.33 -0.04 -1.37 0.09
Solo 63 8.81 16.25 Three 79 8.10 13.32 0.71 1.000 14.69 411.33 0.04 -1.38 0.08
Solo 63 8.81 16.25 Four 59 13.66 27.17 -4.85 0.762 22.21 411.33 -0.24 0.45 0.67
Solo 63 8.81 16.25 Five + 252 13.30 22.65 -4.49 0.628 21.53 411.33 -0.22 1.74 0.96
Two 71 9.56 13.23 Three 79 8.10 13.32 1.46 0.996 13.28 411.33 0.07 -0.61 0.73
Two 71 9.56 13.23 Four 59 13.66 27.17 -4.10 0.859 20.74 411.33 -0.20 0.29 0.61
Two 71 9.56 13.23 Five + 252 13.30 22.65 -3.74 0.767 20.96 411.33 -0.18 1.25 0.89
Three 79 8.10 13.32 Four 59 13.66 27.17 -5.56 0.638 20.41 411.33 -0.27 1.24 0.89
Three 79 8.10 13.32 Five + 252 13.30 22.65 -5.20 0.425 20.82 411.33 -0.26 2.58 1.00
Four 59 13.66 27.17 Five + 252 13.30 22.65 0.36 1.000 23.56 411.33 0.02
-1.69 0.05
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
Solo 63 46.44 12.06 Two 71 40.37 12.55 6.07 0.064 12.32 142.99 0.51 3.74 1.00
Solo 63 46.44 12.06 Three 79 39.47 10.23 6.97 0.016 11.08 142.99 0.58 5.54 1.00
Solo 63 46.44 12.06 Four 59 40.25 10.66 6.19 0.078 11.40 142.99 0.52 4.03 1.00
Solo 63 46.44 12.06 Five + 252 40.85 12.57 5.59 0.022 12.47 142.99 0.47 6.00 1.00
Two 71 40.37 12.55 Three 79 39.47 10.23 0.90 0.995 11.39 142.99 0.08 -0.99 0.16
Two 71 40.37 12.55 Four 59 40.25 10.66 0.12 1.000 11.73 142.99 0.01 -1.84 0.03
Two 71 40.37 12.55 Five + 252 40.85 12.57 -0.48 0.999 12.57 142.99 -0.04 -1.27 0.10
Three 79 39.47 10.23 Four 59 40.25 10.66 -0.78 0.997 10.42 142.99 -0.07 -1.08 0.14
Three 79 39.47 10.23 Five + 252 40.85 12.57 -1.38 0.939 12.06 142.99 -0.12 0.12 0.55
Four 59 40.25 10.66 Five + 252 40.85 12.57 -0.60 0.998 12.23 142.99 -0.05
-1.10 0.14
Power
Power
The Effects of Group Size on On Call Visits for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta
The Effects of Group Size on Hours Worked for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
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Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
Solo 63 3.16 1.52 Two 71 3.07 1.04 0.09 0.999 1.29 1.54 0.07 -1.15 0.13
Solo 63 3.16 1.52 Three 79 3.10 1.04 0.06 1.000 1.28 1.54 0.05 -1.40 0.08
Solo 63 3.16 1.52 Four 59 3.09 1.41 0.07 1.000 1.47 1.54 0.06 -1.43 0.08
Solo 63 3.16 1.52 Five + 252 2.89 1.23 0.27 0.733 1.29 1.54 0.22 1.75 0.96
Two 71 3.07 1.04 Three 79 3.10 1.04 -0.03 1.000 1.04 1.54 -0.02 -1.61 0.05
Two 71 3.07 1.04 Four 59 3.09 1.41 -0.02 1.000 1.22 1.54 -0.02 -1.77 0.04
Two 71 3.07 1.04 Five + 252 2.89 1.23 0.18 0.882 1.19 1.54 0.15 0.76 0.78
Three 79 3.10 1.04 Four 59 3.09 1.41 0.01 1.000 1.21 1.54 0.01 -1.86 0.03
Three 79 3.10 1.04 Five + 252 2.89 1.23 0.21 0.785 1.19 1.54 0.17 1.26 0.90
Four 59 3.09 1.41 Five + 252 2.89 1.23 0.20 0.878 1.27 1.54 0.16 0.83 0.80
MSE Cohen's d Zbeta Power
The Effects of Group Size on Visits per Hour for Female Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std.
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 The trends seen in the data (Figure 4.3.4a) were not substantially supported by 
the statistical analysis.  Only three significant differences between practice sizes were 
identified for female respondents.  Solo practitioners conducted statistically more total 
visits than physicians who worked in settings of five or more physicians.  Solo 
practitioners also saw more patients during regular hours than physicians in practice 
settings of four or more.  Finally, female solo practitioners worked more hours per week 
than their colleagues in any other category.  No other statistically relevant differences 
were uncovered in the analysis of female GP/FPs. 
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Figure 4.3.4b – The Effect of Practice Size on Output for Male GP/FPs 
 
 Based on the trends in the data (Figure 4.3.4b) the relationship between practice 
size and output was not as apparent among male respondents as females.  Like the 
female respondents, total visits and regular visits appeared to drop off considerably 
when moving from solo practitioners to physicians with at least one practice partner.  In 
the case of total visits, however, there were no substantial differences between the 2, 3, 
4, and 5+ physician groups.  The inverse relationship between output and practice size 
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was slightly more apparent in the case of the regular visits measure, but the clear 
difference appeared to be between solo practitioners and all other groups. 
 Similar to the female trends, there appeared to be a slight positive relationship 
between on call visits and practice size.  As practice size increased, the number of 
patients an individual GP/FP tended to while on call appears to increase as well.  There 
was virtually no difference in hours worked on the basis of practice size, while visits per 
hour fell from 3.5 for solo practitioners to 3.1 for physicians in groups of 5 or more.  
The statistical differences are presented in Table 4.3.4b. 
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Table 4.3.4b – The Effect of Practice Size on Output for Male GP/FPs 
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
Solo 70 174.74 68.13 Two 70 158.34 61.35 16.40 0.639 64.83 4091.09 0.26 1.03 0.85
Solo 70 174.74 68.13 Three 64 156.86 53.79 17.88 0.625 61.70 4091.09 0.28 1.39 0.92
Solo 70 174.74 68.13 Four 57 157.44 59.78 17.30 0.681 64.52 4091.09 0.27 1.06 0.86
Solo 70 174.74 68.13 Five + 214 151.60 67.19 23.14 0.143 67.42 4091.09 0.36 3.82 1.00
Two 70 158.34 61.35 Three 64 156.86 53.79 1.48 1.000 57.87 4091.09 0.02 -1.66 0.05
Two 70 158.34 61.35 Four 57 157.44 59.78 0.90 1.000 60.65 4091.09 0.01 -1.79 0.04
Two 70 158.34 61.35 Five + 214 151.60 134.14 6.74 0.976 120.46 4091.09 0.11 -1.02 0.15
Three 64 156.86 53.79 Four 57 157.44 59.78 -0.58 1.000 56.69 4091.09 -0.01 -1.85 0.03
Three 64 156.86 53.79 Five + 214 151.60 134.14 5.26 0.988 120.61 4091.09 0.08 -1.23 0.11
Four 57 157.44 59.78 Five + 214 151.60 134.14 5.84 0.984 122.44 4091.09 0.09
-1.17 0.12
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
Solo 70 162.44 62.46 Two 70 145.76 56.66 16.68 0.532 59.63 3347.36 0.29 1.35 0.91
Solo 70 162.44 62.46 Three 64 142.86 50.66 19.58 0.430 57.13 3347.36 0.34 2.01 0.98
Solo 70 162.44 62.46 Four 57 140.18 50.35 22.26 0.326 57.35 3347.36 0.38 2.41 0.99
Solo 70 162.44 62.46 Five + 214 134.14 60.52 28.30 0.014 61.00 3347.36 0.49 5.86 1.00
Two 70 145.76 56.66 Three 64 142.86 50.66 2.90 1.000 53.88 3347.36 0.05 -1.34 0.09
Two 70 145.76 56.66 Four 57 140.18 50.35 5.58 0.994 53.92 3347.36 0.10 -0.79 0.21
Two 70 145.76 56.66 Five + 214 134.14 60.52 11.62 0.751 59.60 3347.36 0.20 1.33 0.91
Three 64 142.86 50.66 Four 57 140.18 50.35 2.68 0.999 50.51 3347.36 0.05 -1.38 0.08
Three 64 142.86 50.66 Five + 214 134.14 60.52 8.72 0.891 58.42 3347.36 0.15 0.53 0.70
Four 57 140.18 50.35 Five + 214 134.14 60.52 6.04 0.974 58.55 3347.36 0.10 -0.26 0.40
The Effects of Group Size on Total Visits for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
The Effects of Group Size on Regular Visits for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
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Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
Solo 70 12.30 17.42 Two 70 12.56 15.33 -0.26 1.000 16.41 499.66 -0.01 -1.77 0.04
Solo 70 12.30 17.42 Three 64 14.00 18.53 -1.70 0.974 17.96 499.66 -0.08 -0.86 0.19
Solo 70 12.30 17.42 Four 57 17.26 24.78 -4.96 0.827 21.04 499.66 -0.22 0.70 0.76
Solo 70 12.30 17.42 Five + 214 17.46 25.53 -5.16 0.591 23.80 499.66 -0.23 1.69 0.95
Two 70 12.56 15.33 Three 64 14.00 18.53 -1.44 0.979 16.93 499.66 -0.06 -0.98 0.16
Two 70 12.56 15.33 Four 57 17.26 24.78 -4.70 0.845 20.12 499.66 -0.21 0.67 0.75
Two 70 12.56 15.33 Five + 214 17.46 25.53 -4.90 0.619 23.45 499.66 -0.22 1.56 0.94
Three 64 14.00 18.53 Four 57 17.26 24.78 -3.26 0.991 21.70 499.66 -0.15 -0.31 0.38
Three 64 14.00 18.53 Five + 214 17.46 25.53 -3.46 0.963 24.11 499.66 -0.15 0.43 0.67
Four 57 17.26 24.78 Five + 214 17.46 25.53 -0.20 1.000 25.38 499.66 -0.01
-1.83 0.03
Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
Solo 70 50.70 10.52 Two 70 49.57 10.82 1.13 0.992 10.67 126.06 0.10 -0.71 0.24
Solo 70 50.70 10.52 Three 64 49.17 12.14 1.53 0.949 11.32 126.06 0.14 -0.40 0.34
Solo 70 50.70 10.52 Four 57 48.53 10.78 2.17 0.869 10.64 126.06 0.19 0.34 0.63
Solo 70 50.70 10.52 Five + 214 49.12 11.45 1.58 0.903 11.23 126.06 0.14 0.41 0.66
Two 70 49.57 10.82 Three 64 49.17 12.14 0.40 0.998 11.47 126.06 0.04 -1.56 0.06
Two 70 49.57 10.82 Four 57 48.53 10.78 1.04 0.983 10.80 126.06 0.09 -0.88 0.19
Two 70 49.57 10.82 Five + 214 49.12 11.45 0.45 0.997 11.30 126.06 0.04 -1.29 0.10
Three 64 49.17 12.14 Four 57 48.53 10.78 0.64 0.999 11.52 126.06 0.06 -1.35 0.09
Three 64 49.17 12.14 Five + 214 49.12 11.45 0.05 1.000 11.61 126.06 0.00 -1.89 0.03
Four 57 48.53 10.78 Five + 214 49.12 11.45 -0.59 0.997 11.31 126.06 -0.05
-1.10 0.14
The Effects of Group Size on On Call Visits for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
The Effects of Group Size on Hours Worked for Male Physicians
Group 1 Group 2 Mean 
Dif. Sig.
Pooled 
Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d Zbeta Power
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Category n Mean Std. Category n Mean Std.
Solo 70 3.48 1.36 Two 70 3.26 1.34 0.22 0.883 1.35 1.66 0.17 -0.03 0.49
Solo 70 3.48 1.36 Three 64 3.27 1.05 0.21 0.928 1.22 1.66 0.16 0.03 0.51
Solo 70 3.48 1.36 Four 57 3.35 1.32 0.13 0.988 1.34 1.66 0.10 -0.87 0.19
Solo 70 3.48 1.36 Five + 214 3.12 1.30 0.36 0.411 1.31 1.66 0.28 2.65 1.00
Two 70 3.26 1.34 Three 64 3.27 1.05 -0.01 1.000 1.21 1.66 -0.01 -1.86 0.03
Two 70 3.26 1.34 Four 57 3.35 1.32 -0.09 0.995 1.33 1.66 -0.07 -1.20 0.12
Two 70 3.26 1.34 Five + 214 3.12 1.30 0.14 0.978 1.31 1.66 0.11 -0.16 0.44
Three 64 3.27 1.05 Four 57 3.35 1.32 -0.08 0.999 1.18 1.66 -0.06 -1.22 0.11
Three 64 3.27 1.05 Five + 214 3.12 1.30 0.15 0.960 1.25 1.66 0.12 0.05 0.52
Four 57 3.35 1.32 Five + 214 3.12 1.30 0.23 0.854 1.30 1.66 0.18 0.94 0.83
Group 2 Mean 
Dif.
The Effects of Group Size on Visits per Hour for Male Physicians
Zbeta PowerSig. Pooled Std. MSE
Cohen's 
d
Group 1
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 Based on the Scheffe post hoc analyses presented in Table 4.3.4b, practice size 
had little statistically significant association with output.  Only one significant difference 
was identified: male physicians in solo practice conducted significantly more regular 
visits than their male counterparts in practices numbering five or more.  Despite the 
appearance of meaningful trends, the statistical analysis was unable to find any 
additional significant differences. 
4.4 Regression Analyses 
 
4.4.1 Contribution of Gender to Output of GP/FP Services 
Formula: Y = β0 + β1Gender 
Table 4.4.1 – Regression Model for Gender vs. Output 
Model for Gender vs. Output Measures 
Dependent Variable 
% Var. 
Explained 
(Adj. R²) 
Standardized 
Beta Sig. Relationship 
Total Patients / Week 8.5 0.294 0.000 Male > Female 
Patients / Week – Regular Hours 8.2 0.288 0.000 Male > Female 
Patients / Week – On Call 0.8 0.096 0.002 Male > Female 
Hours Worked / Week 10.7 0.329 0.000 Male > Female 
Patients / Hour Worked 0.8 0.094 0.003 Male > Female 
 
 Table 4.4.1 depicts the regression relationship between gender and the five 
dependent output variables.  As indicated by the column labeled ‘Sig.’, the explanation 
of variance contributed by gender was significant for all five output measures.  It 
appeared as though gender was best able to explain variance in hours worked, total 
visits, and regular visits, at 10.7, 8.5, and 8.2 per cent respectively.  Though 
significantly contributing to on call visits, and visits per hour, gender explained only 0.8 
per cent of the variance in each of those variables. 
 This analysis provided sufficient evidence to reject the null hypotheses that 
gender would make no contribution to the variance in output.  Based on this evidence, 
one can conclude that gender significantly contributed to the explanation of variance in 
all five output measures. 
 The standardized beta values (Table 4.4.1) present the slope of the relationship 
between gender and the five output measures.  All of the values presented indicate 
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moderate to weak relationships (gentle slopes) between the two concepts, though the 
relationships between gender and on call visits and between gender and visits per hour 
were substantially weaker than the other three relationships presented. 
 
4.4.2 Contribution of Age to Output of GP/FP Services 
Formula: Y = β0 + β1Age 
Table 4.4.2 – Regression Model for Age vs. Output 
Model for Age vs. Output Measures 
Dependent Variable 
% Var. 
Explained 
(Adj. R²) 
Standardized 
Beta Sig. Relationship 
Total Patients / Week 0.9 0.102 0.001 Positive 
Patients / Week – Regular Hours 1.8 0.139 0.000 Positive 
Patients / Week – On Call 0.4 -0.066 0.037 Positive 
Hours Worked / Week 2.3 0.156 0.000 Positive 
Patients / Hour Worked -0.1 -0.006 0.846 None 
 
 As depicted in Table 4.4.2 above, age significantly explained variance in all but 
one output measure.  Even so, the percentage of variance explained in each significant 
relationship was quite small – just 2.3, 1.8, 0.9, and 0.4 per cent of the variance in hours 
worked, regular visits, total visits, and on call visits respectively.  The analysis did not 
find any statistically significant regression relationship between output and visits per 
hour. 
 This analysis provided sufficient evidence to reject the null hypotheses for the 
effects of age for all but one output measure.  Age significantly contributed to 
explaining variance in output as measured by total visits, regular visits, on call visits, 
and hours worked.  Age was not, however, significantly associated with visits per hour 
and so the null hypothesis specific to that measure could not be rejected. 
 The standardized beta values presented indicate weak relationships between age 
and all of the output measures.  Once again, the relationship between age and on call 
visits was notably weaker than the remaining relationships. 
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4.4.3 Contribution of Payment Method to Output of GP/FP Services 
Formula: Y = β0 + β1Pay 
Table 4.4.3 – Regression Model for Payment Method vs. Output 
Model for Age vs. Output Measures 
Dependent Variable 
% Var. 
Explained 
(Adj. R²) 
Standardized 
Beta Sig. Relationship 
Total Patients / Week 6.6 0.260 0.000 Positive 
Patients / Week – Regular Hours 9.0 0.301 0.000 Positive 
Patients / Week – On Call 0.1 -0.039 0.218 None 
Hours Worked / Week -0.1 0.004 0.900 None 
Patients / Hour Worked 7.6 0.278 0.000 Positive 
 
 Table 4.4.3, displayed above, presents the results of the regression analyses 
conducted between the independent variable ‘payment method’ – the percentage of 
remuneration received through fee-for-service payments – and the five dependent 
variables.  In all but two measures (regular visits and hours worked) payment method 
made a statistically significant contribution to explaining the variance in output.  The r² 
value for regular visits was highest at 9.0%.  This was followed by visits per hour at 
7.6% and total visits at 6.6%.  This result suggested that as physicians received a greater 
percentage of their remuneration through fee-for-service, they conducted more regular 
visits, total visits, and visits per hour. 
 This analysis provided sufficient evidence to reject three of the five null 
hypotheses associated with the effects of payment method on output of physician 
services.  With p-values greater than 0.05, the null hypotheses for the effects of payment 
method on on call visits and hours worked could not be rejected – no significant 
contribution was found.  However, the effects of payment method on the remaining 
three output measures (total visits, regular visits, and visits per hour), as evidenced by 
their respective p-values, were highly significant.  As such, the null hypotheses for each 
could be rejected and one can conclude that payment method significantly contributed to 
output as measured by these variables. 
 Once again the standardized beta scores displayed in Table 4.4.3 suggest 
moderate to weak relationships between payment method and the output measures.  
Payment method was most important in predicting regular visits followed by visits per 
 81 
hour and total visits.  Payment method was not significant in predicting hours worked or 
on call visits. 
 
4.4.4 Contribution of Practice Size to Output of GP/FP Services 
Formula: Y = β0 + β1PSize 
Table 4.4.4 – Regression Model for Practice Size vs. Output 
Model for Age vs. Output Measures 
Dependent Variable 
% Var. 
Explained 
(Adj. R²) 
Standardized 
Beta Sig. Relationship 
Total Patients / Week 1.9 -0.140 0.000 Negative 
Patients / Week – Regular Hours 3.5 -0.190 0.000 Negative 
Patients / Week – On Call 0.7 0.092 0.004 Positive 
Hours Worked / Week 0.5 -0.080 0.011 Negative 
Patients / Hour Worked 0.6 -0.081 0.010 Negative 
 
 The results of regression procedures between the independent variable ‘practice 
size’ and the five output measures are presented in Table 4.4.4.  As shown in the ‘Sig.’ 
column, practice size significantly contributed to explaining the variation in output in all 
five output measures.  In each case, however, the magnitude of the contribution was 
small.  Practice size explained 3.5% of the variance in regular visits, 1.9% in total visits, 
and less than one per cent in each of the remaining output measures. 
 The evidence was sufficient to reject the null hypotheses associated with the 
effects of practice size on GP/FP output.  P-values for the effects of payment method on 
all output measures are below 0.05 and therefore sufficient to conclude that practice size 
was a statistically significant contributor to variance in output as measured by total 
visits, regular visits, on call visits, hours worked, and visits per hour. 
 All standardized beta scores reported in Table 4.4.4 indicate weak relationships 
between group size and the dependent output measures.  Regular visits and total visits 
were the most responsive to differences in group size, but beta scores of -0.190 and  
-0.140 are not substantial. 
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4.4.5 Combined Contribution to Output of GP/FP Services 
Formula: Y = β0 + β1Gender + β2Age + β3Pay + β4PSize 
Table 4.4.5a – Regression Model – Combined Model for Output 
Model for Output of GP/FP Services 
Dependent Variable Independent Variable 
Standardized 
Beta Sig. 
% Var. 
Explained 
(Adj. R²) 
Gender 0.301 0.000 
Age -0.034 0.275 
Payment Method 0.251 0.000 
Total Patients / Week 
Group Size -0.110 0.000 
16.3 
Gender 0.282 0.000 
Age 0.002 0.942 
Payment Method 0.285 0.000 
Patients / Week – Regular Hours 
Group Size -0.153 0.000 
19.4 
Gender 0.133 0.000 
Age -0.100 0.003 
Payment Method -0.022 0.493 
Patients / Week – On Call 
Group Size 0.085 0.007 
2.4 
Gender 0.312 0.000 
Age 0.046 0.152 
Payment Method -0.010 0.742 
Hours Worked / Week 
Group Size -0.061 0.044 
11.1 
Gender 0.118 0.000 
Age -0.078 0.016 
Payment Method 0.280 0.000 
Patients / Hour Worked 
Group Size -0.062 0.043 
9.1 
 Table 4.4.5 presents the regression model for the combined effects of the four 
independent variables (gender, age, payment method, and group size) on each of the five 
output measures.  The four independent variables combined to explain 19.4% of the 
variation in regular visits.  This was the highest percentage of variance explained, 
followed by total visits (16.3%), hours worked (11.1%), visits per hour (9.1%), and on 
call visits (2.4%).  Interestingly, in the two most complete models (regular visits and 
total visits) the contribution of age was not statistically significant.  Age was also not 
significant in the model for hours worked.   
 Payment method was not significant in the model for hours worked or the model 
for on call visits.  All independent variables were significant in the model for visits per 
hour, but combined to explain just 9.1% of the variation in that measure.  
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 The standardized beta scores suggest that gender was the most important 
predictor of total visits, on call visits, and hours worked, but in no case was the strength 
of the relationship between gender and output substantial.  Payment method was the 
most important predictor of regular visits, followed closely by gender, and was the most 
important predictor of visits per hour.  Payment method was only slightly less important 
than gender in predicting total visits.  The remaining independent variables – age and 
practice size – were relatively unimportant predictors in all output measures. 
 
4.4.6 Reduced Models and Parsimony 
 After the initial regression models were produced containing all four 
independent variables, the models were reduced to eliminate the independent variables 
that did not significantly contribute to the explanation of variance in the output measure.  
This procedure was completed in two steps 1) eliminate insignificant independent 
variables; and 2) create models with the highest levels of parsimony possible.   
 Tests for parsimony were conducted to determine the ‘best-fit’ model for each of 
the five dependent output measures.  The mathematical tests have been included as 
Appendix B.  Table 4.9.2 presents the initial models, the models after removing 
insignificant contributors, and the ‘best fit’ models following the tests for parsimony: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 84 
 
Table 4.4.5b – Initial, Reduced, and Best Fit Output Models 
Initial Model                  
(All Factors) 
Reduced Model      
(Only Significant)        
Best Fit Model         
(Post-Parsimony) Dependent Variable 
Factors R² (%) Factors R² (%) Factors R² (%) 
Total Patients / Week 
Gender 
Age 
Payment 
Prac. Size 
16.3 
Gender 
Payment 
Prac. Size 16.2 
Gender 
Payment 
Prac. Size 16.2 
Patients / Week –  
Regular 
Gender 
Age 
Payment 
Prac. Size 
19.4 
Gender 
Payment 
Prac. Size 19.3 
Payment 
Gender 
Prac. Size 19.3 
Patients / Week –  
On Call 
Gender 
Age 
Payment 
Prac. Size 
2.4 
Gender 
Age 
Prac. Size 
 
2.5 
Gender 
Prac. Size 
Age 2.5 
Hours / Week 
Gender 
Age 
Payment 
Prac. Size 
11.1 
Gender 
Prac. Size 
11.1 
Gender 
Prac. Size 
11.3 
Patients / Hour 
Gender 
Age 
Payment 
Prac. Size 
9.1 
Gender 
Age 
Payment 
Prac. Size 
9.1 
Payment 
Gender 
Age 8.9 
 
 As depicted in the table, the removal of the insignificant contributors resulted in 
very little change to the percentage of variation explained by the independent variables.  
Tests for parsimony resulted in the elimination of just one independent variable (practice 
size) from one model (visits per hour).  It is safe to conclude, then, that model reduction 
and tests for parsimony have provided the best fit models, as fewer input variables have 
resulted in little to no change in the percentage of variation explained.  Appendix B 
contains a summary of all of the findings of the current study. 
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5.0 Discussion 
 
 This discussion will begin with an interpretation of the results with an eye to the 
prevailing views within the literature.  The discussion will then shift to practical/policy 
implications of the findings with regard to the supply of physician services.  
Specifically, section 5.2 will address how the results might: improve policy making 
decisions; interact with the changing structure of the medical profession; and combine 
with evolving work habits to affect the supply of physician services.  Finally the 
discussion will address the research implications of the study; changes that may have 
improved the study; areas of research that were not sufficiently addressed; and areas of 
research that have been opened up for further inquiry. 
 
5.1 Interpretation of Results 
 
 To briefly review the study process, each hypothesis was presented in terms of 
the effect of an independent variable - gender, age, payment method, and/or practice size 
– on GP/FP output as measured by the following variables: 
• total patient visits per week (total visits) 
• patient visits per week during regular hours (regular visits) 
• patient visits per week while on call (on call visits) 
• hours worked per week (hours worked) 
• patient visits per hour worked (visits per hour) 
 
 The null hypothesis (H0) predicted no differences in the output measures would 
be found between groups, while the alternative hypotheses speculated there would in 
fact be differences.  In the case of the analysis of variance procedures, a Scheffe post 
hoc analysis was used to identify specific differences between groups when the ANOVA 
deemed them to exist. 
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 In some cases, the null hypothesis for the effect of an independent variable was 
rejected in a test against one or more output variable, but not all.  In cases such as these, 
one cannot conclude that the independent variable had an impact upon the general 
concept of physician output.  Rather, one must identify the specific measures of output 
that are affected by the independent variable in question. 
 Throughout the discussion of comparative procedures, male and female 
respondents are addressed separately.  As presented in Section 3.0, the sample from 
which the data were drawn was stratified to ensure sufficient representation of female 
GP/FPs.  This resulted in a sample which contained a disproportionate amount of female 
respondents, relative to the actual Canadian GP/FP population.  As such, each of the 
comparative procedures requires separate treatment of male and female respondents.  
The specific effects of gender on output are dealt with in Section 5.1.1, when male and 
female output patterns are compared. 
 
5.1.1 Gender – Interpretation of Results 
 In terms of the effect of gender on output of physician services, the analysis 
uncovered significant output differences between males and females in all output 
measures.  The null hypotheses were rejected in all cases, as male GP/FPs reported 
statistically higher levels of output than their female counterparts in all output measures 
employed by this study.   
 The results of the comparative analyses are consistent with those reported in the 
literature.  As presented in Section 2.0, Chan reported in 2003 that female physicians, in 
all age groups, across all specialties tend to work fewer hours per week than their male 
counterparts.5  The 2005 College of Family Physicians of Canada JANUS report 
supported Chan’s finding in addition to suggesting male GP/FPs tend to see a greater 
number of patients per week.18  The findings of the present study with regard to patients 
per hour are also supported in the literature by Chan,5 CIHI,9 and the Canadian Medical 
Association.10 
 Potential reasons for the discrepancy in output between male and female 
physicians were submitted by Kilmartin et al, who suggested that key issues for women 
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in medical practice are job satisfaction; balance between personal and work life; and 
availability of flexible work and training – all issues that may cause female physicians to 
opt for workloads of lower intensity.  In addition, they suggested while societal norms 
have evolved to accept females in the medical profession, women are still expected to 
fill the role of ‘homemaker’ in their personal lives.26  This study provides additional 
support for the greater propensity of female GP/FPs to produce lower levels of output 
than male GP/FPs. 
 It should be noted, however, that within-group variability identified suggests that 
a significant array of output patterns exist even within the genders.  There is no specific 
output pattern that all male physicians follow, and similarly no specific output pattern 
followed by their female counterparts.  On the aggregate, however, the female 
physicians sampled reported lower output levels in all categories measured. 
 The patients per hour measure employed herein presents an important 
phenomenon that must not be ignored.  Given that female respondents reported lower 
patients per hour levels, one might infer from this that they are spending more time with 
each patient that they do see.  Indeed, Roter et al found that the average patient visit 
conducted by a female physician exceeded that of the average male colleague by two 
minutes.36  In addition, the authors submitted, female physicians were more likely than 
their male colleagues to involve patients in their care decisions and address not only 
medical concerns, but emotional concerns as well.  These activities may require 
additional time, and explain the lower levels of patient throughput reported by female 
physicians.  While acknowledging the importance of consultation length and 
engagement to the patient experience, the focus of this study was to report and explain 
output of physician services.  In addition, the current study made no attempt to measure 
the most desirable level of output, only to report and quantify existing levels. 
 
5.1.2 Age – Interpretation of Results 
 The effects of age on output of GP/FP services were not as strong.  The 
comparative analyses uncovered significant differences in output and rejected the null 
hypotheses in only three output measures.  For example, output among female 
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respondents between 45 and 64 exceeded that of their older colleagues in three of the 
five output categories.  No differences were found among males on the basis of age.   
 The trends regarding the effects of age on output approximated the prevailing 
view of the literature, but the actual statistically significant differences were less 
resounding.  Reports published by Chan,5 the Canadian Medical Association,10 the 
College of Family Physicians of Canada,18 and the American Academy of Family 
Physicians15 all suggested that output was highest for physicians in the middle aged 
category (roughly between 40 and 60).  While the raw mean scores identified in the 
current study seem to support these assertions, the differences were not deemed 
statistically significant.  Substantial variability within groups may have contributed to 
the lack of statistical significance.  In addition, the sample size may have been too small 
to warrant the division of physicians into five separate age groups. 
 
5.1.3 Payment Method -  Interpretation of Results 
 With respect to the effects of payment method on output of GP/FP services, 
several null hypotheses were rejected by the analysis.  Specifically, responding female 
GP/FPs who received less than 20% of their income through fee-for-service payments 
reported significantly lower levels than their colleagues in three output categories: total 
visits, regular visits, and visits per hour.  No differences were identified between the 20-
80% group and the ‘greater than’ 80% group among females in any output measure. 
 The analysis identified more significant differences among male physicians.  All 
three payment groups differed on the basis of total visits, regular visits, and visits per 
hour.  Higher levels of fee for service remuneration appear to result in higher levels of 
output in these three output categories.  An additional difference was identified in the 
hours worked output category, where male respondents receiving less than 20% of their 
remuneration through fee for service reported fewer hours worked than the 20-80% 
group.  Curiously, the > 80% group did not differ significantly from either group on the 
basis of hours worked. 
 The comparative analyses conducted support the available literature on the 
effects of payment method on output of services.  As Leitch and Walker,28 Xu and Yu,29 
and Grignon et al14 have suggested, output of services tends to be lower among 
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physicians receiving payment through fixed sources than for their colleagues who are 
remunerated through volume based schemes.  A clear incentive seems to exist for the 
fee-for-service physician: the greater the throughput of patients, the greater the financial 
reward.  This same incentive does not exist for physicians who receive little to no 
volume-based remuneration.  The findings of the current study support this 
interpretation. 
 Although both male and female GP/FPs displayed different patient per hour 
levels on the basis of payment method, just one difference was found when hours 
worked was compared.  While GP/FPs remunerated more substantially on a fee-for-
service basis see more patients over a given period of time, perhaps those less dependent 
upon volume based schemes spend more time with each patient they attend to.  Fixed 
remuneration methods have also been found to enable practitioners to spend more time 
teaching, researching, and maintaining their knowledge.  A 1997 Government of Ontario 
report entitled Alternate Payment Plans submitted that salaried physicians spend 5.6 
hours more on these activities than their fee-for-service counterparts.37  Additionally, 
Leitch and Walker reported that fixed systems encourage attention to preventive 
medicine; are more conducive to a team building, integrated system; and allow for more 
effective planning of physician allocation.28 
 
5.1.4 Practice Size – Interpretation of Results 
 With respect to the effects of practice size on output of GP/FP services, the 
results approximated those identified in the literature, but provided very few statistically 
significant findings.  The relationships between output and practice size produced 
inverse relationships: as the number of physicians increases, output decreases.  The most 
substantial difference was that between physicians practicing in solo arrangements and 
those plying their trade with at least one partner. 
 While the analysis produced many trends, the null hypotheses were only rejected 
in a small number of cases.  The literature available on the effects of practice size on 
physician output is perhaps the most inconclusive of any output driver tested within this 
study.  Reinhardt, in a 1975 study, concluded that physicians in single specialty group 
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settings actually saw more patients than their colleagues in solo practice.19  The trends 
presented above seem to contradict Reinhardt’s conclusions.   
 Other sources, such as the College of Family Physicians of Canada,31 and James 
Hale,30 have suggested that the move toward group practice, particularly among young 
physicians, has been driven by a desire for more flexible workloads.  The implication is 
that group practice offers a greater balance between work and life, suggesting that group 
practice physicians might produce lower output levels than their solo practice 
colleagues.  The findings of the current study seem to support this latter argument.  
Unfortunately, the lack of statistical significance in the differences presented renders 
these observations somewhat inconclusive. 
 While very few statistically significant differences were identified in the 
analysis, the trends suggested substantial differences in means between solo practice 
respondents and the rest of the sample within both genders.  In light of this, a post hoc t-
test was performed to compare output scores for solo practice physicians to those of all 
other physicians – the 2, 3, 4, and 5+ physician groups were combined into one ‘group’ 
category.  The results of this post hoc analysis are included as Appendix D. 
 The post hoc analysis yielded clearer statistically significant differences when 
solo practice GP/FPs were compared to their group practice counterparts.  Within both 
genders, solo practice respondents conducted more total visits and more regular visits.  
In addition, female solo practice respondents reported significantly greater hours worked 
than female group practice respondents.  There were no differences between solo and 
group respondents on the basis of on call visits or visits per hour in either gender, and no 
difference in hours worked for males.  The differences identified, however, would seem 
to support the suggestion that physicians choosing group practice for flexibility are 
seeing fewer patients than their solo practice colleagues. 
 
5.1.5 Regression Procedures – Interpretation of Results 
 This study attempted to measure the effects of potential drivers on the output of 
GP/FP services, the latter of which was measured in a number of different ways, 
including: total patient visits per week; patient visits per week during regular hours; 
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patient visits per week during on call; hours worked per week; and patient visits per hour 
worked.  The final analysis conducted quantified the combined contribution to variance 
in output of all four independent variables.  In doing so, ‘best fit’ models were created 
for each of the five dependent output variables.  
 The regression analyses conducted between gender and the dependent output 
variables presented much the same result as the comparative analyses.  For all output 
measures, gender was a significant contributor to the explanation of variance.  Most 
notably, gender explained 10.2% of the variance in hours worked per week.  This was 
the highest contribution of gender to any of the five dependent output measures. 
 While age was identified as a significant contributor to output in all measures 
aside from visits per hour, the actual contribution to each measure was small.  Age 
explained just 2.3% of the variance in hours worked, which was the highest contribution 
made by age to any of the output measures. 
 The regression procedures determined payment method made significant 
contributions to explaining variance in 3 of the 5 dependent output categories.  Payment 
method was not a significant contributor to on call visits or hours worked.  The analysis 
identified R² values of 9.0%, 7.6%, and 6.6% for regular visits, visits per hour, and total 
patients. 
 Practice size was a statistically significant contributor to explaining the variance 
in all dependent variables.  In terms of the magnitude of the contribution, the analyses 
uncovered very little.  Only the total patients and regular patients measures produced R² 
values over 1% (1.9% and 3.5% respectively).   
 When all independent variables – gender, age, payment method, and practice 
size – were regressed, as a group, against the output measures they were able to explain 
a different proportion of the variance in each.  In no case were the selected independent 
variables able to explain a substantial percentage of the variance.  The highest R² values 
– those for total visits and regular visits – approach 20% with three factors included in 
the model.   
 It might be argued that the achievement of this level of explanation from just 
three factors is substantial.  When one considers the overwhelming focus of the 
literature, however, on the independent variables employed, one might expect their 
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combined contribution to be greater.  This lack of explanation from the key factors 
certainly begs the question: if gender, age, payment method, and practice size – the most 
frequently cited output drivers – explain less than one fifth of the variance in GP/FP 
output, what accounts for the remaining 80%? 
 This study also addressed the strength of the relationships between the four 
independent output drivers and the five dependent output measures.  The results suggest 
that, relative to the other independent variables measured, gender and payment method 
were the most important predictors of output.  It is important to note, however, that no 
reported standardized beta score indicated a strong relationship between any 
independent variable and any dependent output measure. 
 In addition to the prevalence of age, gender, payment method, and practice size, 
within the literature, there are also allusions to the less tangible concept of ‘lifestyle 
preferences’.8   These are defined as individual choices made by individual physicians, 
based on their life circumstances or general disposition toward work, with regard to 
what level of output they wish to provide.   
 The inherent nature of ‘preference’ makes it difficult to quantify.  An individual 
physician who enjoys working long hours and seeing many patients may choose not to 
in light of some sort of personal circumstance.  On the other hand, a physician with no 
similar personal circumstance may simply choose not to work as much because they 
prefer more free time.  As such, to create a tangible measure for lifestyle preferences is 
challenging. 
 While the measurement of personal preference is inherently difficult, perhaps 
there are more tangible factors that contribute to GP/FP output that have not been 
identified, in the literature or by this study.   The role of the present study has been to 
quantify the contribution of gender, age, payment method, and practice size to 
explaining the variance in GP/FP service output.  Potential opportunities for additional 
research are discussed below when the focus of the discussion shifts to research 
implications. 
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5.1.6 Output Measures – Interpretation of Results 
 In terms of the five dependent variables and their appropriateness as measures of 
output, some conclusions can be drawn from the analysis conducted within the present 
study.  Of the three ‘volume’ measures included – total visits, regular visits, and on call 
visits – the ‘total’ and ‘regular’ measures are by far the most responsive to the set of 
independent variables employed, garnering 16.2 and 19.3 per cent explanation of 
variance.  There were also multiple differences identified by the one way analyses in 
these two output categories.  The responsiveness seems to be more attributable to the 
regular visits measure, given that the total visits measure is a simple sum of the ‘regular’ 
measure and the ‘on call’ measure. 
 The inclusion of the on call visits measure seems to dilute the total visits 
measure.  For all intents and purposes, there are very few differences in the number of 
patient visits physicians accept during their on call hours.  The independent variables 
employed by the study were able to explain just 2.5% of the variance in on call visits, 
suggesting that the number of patients GP/FPs see while on call is not substantially 
dependent upon the factor variables employed.  Perhaps the propensity to see patients 
while on call is influenced by other characteristics; alternatively, GP/FPs are 
homogenous in their inclination to see patients during this time. 
 While the regular visits measure is clearly the most responsive to the set of 
factor variables employed, the inclusion of on call visits was quite appropriate.  The 
objective of the study was to determine the effects of several factor variables on output 
of physician services and, by extension, availability of those services to the population.  
Since some patients are tended to while a physician is on call, the exclusion of the on 
call portion of patient visits at the outset would have illegitimated a comprehensive 
representation of output. 
 The hours per week measure is unique in that it does not factor in the number of 
patient visits conducted by responding GP/FPs.  The study’s independent variables 
explained 11.3% of the variance in the number of hours respondents work per week.  
The inclusion of this output measure as well as the computed visits per hour ‘efficiency’ 
measure provide important information that cannot be obtained from the pure volume 
measures.  These measures provide insight into how quickly the respondent is seeing 
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patients and perhaps how much non-patient related work the respondent is conducting, 
such as teaching and research, administration, and maintaining knowledge. 
 The dependent variables employed herein provide several measures of physician 
output activity.  It must be noted, however, that the concept of ‘output’ is not necessarily 
synonymous with ‘productivity’.  While higher levels of ‘productivity’ are often 
desirable, it is important not to broadly suggest the same of higher output levels, 
especially if higher throughput of patients comes at the expense of physician service 
quality or attention to detail.  In addition, time spent maintaining knowledge, teaching, 
and/or researching must not be considered unproductive. 
 As stated previously, this study has not sought to render a verdict on the most 
desirable level of output or to suggest that physicians should strive for the highest 
possible output of patient visits, hours worked, or patient visits per hour worked.  The 
results presented serve only to only to identify and quantify the effects of various factors 
on output. 
 
5.2 Policy Implications 
 
 As stated at the outset, the aggregate supply of GP/FP visits (VA) over a given 
time period is the product of two elementary measures: 1) the total number (N) of 
GP/FPs and the structure of the GP/FP population, and 2) the number of patient ( iV ) 
visits that each of these GP/FPs accepts over this time period: 
iA VNV ×=                                                            (5.1) 
Both figures, naturally, are positively related to total supply: as one or both increase, 
ceteris paribus, total supply increases; as one or both decrease total supply responds in 
kind. 
 The structure of the GP/FP population (N) is influenced, as stated within this 
paper’s conceptual framework, by public policy.  Governments, in cooperation with 
Canada’s medical schools, attempt to estimate the necessary supply of GP/FPs and 
adjust admissions to training programs accordingly.  The second term, the average 
output of the individual GP/FP ( iV ), is influenced by several factors including gender, 
age, payment method, and practice size. 
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 The objective of this study was to shed some light on this second phenomenon – 
to what extent do gender, age, payment method, and practice size influence the supply of 
GP/FP services?  The previous discussion answered that question.  The discussion now 
attempts to incorporate the results that correspond to that objective with the first 
determinant of supply: the size and structure of the GP/FP population.  In short, how 
will this study’s findings with respect to the drivers of output combine with the 
anticipated evolution of the GP/FP workforce to impact public policy decisions? 
 Generally speaking, the results presented immediately prior to this subsection 
suggest: 1) male GP/FPs see more patients and work longer hours than their female 
counterparts; 2) while physicians between the ages of 45 and 65 displayed the highest 
levels of output, age was perhaps not as influential as originally expected; 3) GP/FPs 
remunerated substantially on a fee-for-service basis see more patients than GP/FPs 
remunerated through other schemes; and 4) GP/FPs in solo practice see more patients 
than their colleagues who practice in groups of two or more.  As presented in section 
2.2, changes within the GP/FP population can be expected on all of these fronts.   
 
5.2.1 Gender – Effects on Supply of GP/FP Services 
 With respect to gender, past trends in the objective data and the outlook going 
forward suggest overwhelmingly that the female proportion of the physician population 
will grow.  The 32% of the total physician population currently occupied by females is 
expected to reach 40% by 2015.8  Female physicians, relative to their male colleagues, 
display a greater propensity to opt for the general/family practice specialization.10  
While the gap appears to be narrowing,12 one can safely assume that an increase to the 
female proportion of the overall physician population will lead to an equal or greater 
increase in the female contingent within the GP/FP ranks. 
 The findings of the present study with regard to the effects of gender on output 
of GP/FP services suggest that the increasing ‘feminization’ of the GP/FP workforce 
will result in significant ramifications for health human resource policy makers.  If 
females are making up a greater percentage of the overall GP/FP workforce (as the 
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literature and objective data suggest) while displaying lower levels of output than their 
male counterparts (as this study has confirmed) one can expect average output to fall.   
 In light of this logic, the total GP/FP workforce would have to increase in order 
to avoid a decrease in aggregate output of patient visits.  A study released by the 
Physician Resource Strategy for Canada suggests that the current physician to citizen 
ratio is expected only to persist, assuming that retirement, graduation, and net migration 
rates do the same.8  This implies that, barring an unforeseen change in trend, we can 
expect an overall decrease, ceteris paribus, in the supply of patient visits to GP/FPs due 
to the changing gender structure of the physician population. 
 
5.2.2 Age – Effects on Supply of GP/FP Services 
 The second factor addressed in this study was the effect of age on output of 
GP/FP services.  While the analysis uncovered fairly little with regards to statistical 
significance, trends which approximated the available literature were quite apparent.  As 
such, changes to the age structure of the GP/FP population may result in implications for 
physician human resource planning.   
 The average age of the Canadian physician population increased from 45.6 to 
48.6 between 1993 and 2002.7  In 2004, less than one quarter (24%) of the physician 
population was under the age of 40, down from 28% in 1999 – a four point decrease in 
just five years.10  The contingent of physicians over the age of 50 experienced the 
opposite shift, as its proportion of the total workforce rose from 39% in 1999 to 44% in 
2004.10  The available data also suggests that GP/FPs tend to be younger than their 
specialist counterparts, as the latter undergo lengthier educational and training 
requirements.  The age of the average specialist rose by just one per cent between 1993 
and 2002, while the GP/FP average increased from 43.3 to 46.6.11  These figures suggest 
that recent increases to the average age of the overall physician workforce have occurred 
predominately within the GP/FP subpopulation. 
 According to the Canadian Medical Association,38 34% of GP/FPs were under 
45 years of age in 2006.  The same data suggests that the 45 – 65 contingent made up 
55% of the total GP/FP workforce.  These numbers are moderately alarming.  In 20 
years, the < 45 group will relieve the 45 – 65 group, but the former will have insufficient 
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numbers to fully replace the latter group on a one for one basis.  Recalling the 
conceptual model – iA VNV ×=  – the total supply of GP/FPs (N) can be expected to 
fall.  Without an equal and opposite increase in average patient visits ( iV ), one would 
expect output within the 45 – 65 group to fall as a result of the changing age structure.  
Given the significant percentage of aggregate supply of patient visits ( AV ) attributable to 
the 45 – 65 group, one would anticipate a serious reduction in the availability of GP/FP 
visits. 
 In addition, the literature suggests – and trends presented within the current study 
support the claim – that younger physicians produce lower levels of output than the 45 
to 65 contingent.  What is not clear, however, are the reasons for the discrepancies in 
output.  Specifically, are differences a result of age and life stage or are they a result of 
generational preferences?  In other words – will the current contingent of < 45 year old 
physicians adopt the work habits of the current contingent of 45 – 65 year olds when the 
former reach the latter’s current state, or will younger physicians carry their present 
behaviour forward? 
 The importance of such a question is clear.  If today’s average young physician 
adopts the output level of today’s average middle-aged physician when the former enters 
her middle years, one can expect average output of patient visits ( iV ) to remain 
constant.  As such, aggregate output (VA) will fall only in proportion to the nominal 
decrease in the workforce (N).  On the other hand, if today’s young physician carries her 
current work habits forward into her middle years, one can expect the reduction in 
aggregate output (VA) to be compounded further by a reduction in average output ( iV ). 
 While changing behavioral patterns are difficult to anticipate, there are reasons 
to believe that the second scenario is more likely than the first.  American author Lois 
Margaret Nora, in a paper presented to the International Medical Workforce Congress, 
divides physicians into four categories on the basis of age:39 the Silent Generation (1925 
– 1942); the Boomers (born 1943-1960); the GenXers (1961-1981); and the Millennial 
Generation (1982-2001).  While Nora is an American author depicting the American 
physician population, her points are salient to the Canadian physician workforce.   
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 Nora submits that the Boomers, due partially to their upbringing during 
economically prosperous times within two-parent stable households, “are known for 
their intense work ethic…value teams and have a ‘can do’ spirit.”  She suggests, in 
addition, that to Boomers “paying one’s dues is an expected part of life, and rewards are 
often justified on the basis of seniority.”  Nora’s assessment, based on the dates 
provided, would define as Boomers all responding GP/FPs between the ages of 44 and 
62.  Physicians over the age of 62, based on the same assessment, are part of the Silent 
Generation. 
 The youngest physicians in the study sample – those below the age of 44 – fall 
within the Generation X group.  Nora’s paper also provides an assessment of the 
GenXers.  Brought up during difficult times, often in unstable and stressful familial 
environments, GenXers, suggests Nora, demonstrate “a strong commitment to balance 
and integration between their personal and professional lives.”  She submits as well that 
GenXers are hard workers and display superior technological skills to those of their 
older colleagues.   
 With regard to their work habits, Nora argues that the focus of this generation is 
on “completing a job well and does not necessarily incorporate long hours, enthusiasm 
for extra work without compensation, or intense loyalty to the organization.”  In 
addition, GenXers value interesting work, flexible environments, continual feedback, 
and opportunities for personal and professional growth.  Finally, “whereas Boomers 
reward seniority,” Nora concludes, “Generation Xers reward and respect competence.”  
Nora’s research suggests that differences in output between GP/FPs within different age 
groups are more than just a function of physician life stage. 
 In 2004, the American research organization Merrit, Hawkins & Associates 
conducted a survey of physicians between 50 and 65 years of age.40  Among other 
questions, the survey asked responding physicians to rate the work ethic of younger 
physicians compared to that of their own generation.  Of the 436 physicians who 
responded to the survey, not a single one indicated that today’s young physicians are 
harder working than their own generation.  Just 29% of respondents placed their work 
ethic on equal footing with the younger generation, and 64% indicated that physicians 
coming out of training today are less dedicated and hard working than themselves. 
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 The authors of the study suggested that the response “underscores the profound 
gap in perspectives and backgrounds that may exist between more senior physicians and 
those new to medicine.”  They go on to submit that more recently trained physicians 
place more emphasis on quality-of-life issues than senior physicians and expect set 
hours and regular vacation time.  The authors conclude that this attitudinal disconnect is 
one reason that an absence of the most senior physicians could significantly impact the 
supply of physician services.  
 We now return to the conceptual model presented above: iA VNV ×= .  As 
discussed, the changing structure of the GP/FP population (N) going forward can be 
expected drive aggregate output (VA) down.  The conclusions of Merritt Hawkins and 
those of Lois Margaret Nora provide insight into the future state of average individual 
physician output ( iV ).  Specifically, based on the generational differences in attitudes 
toward work, we can expect that the work habits, and therefore the average individual 
output ( iV ) of today’s younger GP/FPs will be carried forward as they become 
tomorrow’s senior GP/FPs.  This will place downward pressure on iV and therefore 
downward pressure on VA in addition to that created by the changing structure of the 
GP/FP population ( N ). 
 
5.2.3 Payment Method – Effects on Supply of GP/FP Services 
 The third factor variable measured against output was respondent payment 
method.  The analysis confirmed the prevailing view of the literature – GP/FPs who are 
remunerated on a volume (or fee-for-service) basis display higher levels of output than 
physicians who are remunerated through salaried and blended payment methods.  It is 
likely, therefore, that the evolving payment structure of the aggregate GP/FP population 
will result in changes to the aggregate supply of GP/FP services. 
 While fee-for-service has been (and still is) the dominant form of physician 
remuneration in Canada, the tide appears to be shifting toward alternative methods.  
According to the Canadian Medical Association, in 1990, 67.5 per cent of all Canadian 
physicians were remunerated through fee-for-service payments.  During the same year, 
9.2% reported salary was their main method of payment, while 20.8% cited some form 
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of blended payment method.  Thirteen years later, in 2003, the fee-for-service and 
salaried proportions had fallen to 56.9 and 7.6 per cent respectively, while blended 
payment methods had risen drastically to 32%. 
 While the number of physicians receiving salaried remuneration did not 
substantially change over this period, preference for the method increased from 18.3% 
in 1995 to 27.1% in 2003, suggests the CMA.10  Over the same time period, preference 
for fee-for-service remuneration dropped from 50.4% to 36.5% as did preference for 
blended methods, from 25.0% to 21.1%.  Perhaps the availability of alternatives to fee-
for-service has not yet met these changing physician preferences and has resulted in the 
discrepancy between preferred payment method and actual method of remuneration.   
 In any case, it appears as though physician preferences have begun to shift from 
volume based remuneration schemes to those that offer income stability and lifestyle 
flexibility.  This rationalization reconciles with the logic presented by Nora with regard 
to generational disparities.  As Generation X and Millennial physicians begin to account 
for a greater percentage of the physician population, bringing with them a desire for 
lifestyle balance, the popularity of fixed payment methods can be expected to ascend 
even further.   
 Returning, then, to the conceptual model previously discussed ( iA VNV ×= ), 
the literature has suggested, and the current study has confirmed, that the average 
individual output ( iV ) of salaried physicians and physicians receiving their 
remuneration through blended payment methods is lower than that of physicians paid 
mainly through fee-for-service.  The literature and objective data also suggest that 
blended payment methods have become more prevalent, and salary is becoming more 
popular amongst the physician population.  This suggests, in the future, the total GP/FP 
population (N) will be more substantially remunerated through methods other than FFS.  
The increasing prevalence of these payment methods – which seem to result in lower 
levels of service output – can be expected to drive down the aggregate supply of 
physician services (VA). 
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5.2.4 Practice Size – Effects on Output of GP/FP Services 
 The final output driver tested was GP/FP practice size – the number of 
physicians working in the same practice setting as the responding GP/FP.  The 
prevailing view within the literature, though somewhat contested therein, was confirmed 
by the analysis: with the exception of time on call, GP/FPs in solo practice see more 
patients and work longer hours than GP/FPs who share their practice with other 
physicians.  If the group-solo practice mixture evolves on an aggregate level, there are 
potential implications for policy makers. 
 As presented in this study’s review of the literature, GP/FPs appear to be moving 
toward group practice.  The Physician Human Resource Strategy for Canada submitted 
that 64% of GP/FPs were active in group practice in 1998.8  They suggest, in addition, 
this number is expected to increase as the physician population evolves.  This prediction 
seems to reconcile with one of the over-arching views of the literature: younger 
physicians, as they move into the workforce, are placing greater emphasis on balanced 
lifestyles and flexibility in their schedules.  Group practice appears to offer greater 
flexibility; if a physician needs time off, there is at least one other physician to take over 
the patient load.  Set hours and set vacations are more easily accomplished under a 
group arrangement than a solo arrangement. 
 Recalling the conceptual model once more ( iA VNV ×= ), the aggregate supply 
of physician services (VA) is a product of the physician population (N) and the individual 
output of the average GP/FP ( iV ).  The literature and the present study indicate that 
differences in the individual output of the average GP/FP ( iV ) exist, depending on 
whether the GP/FP is in solo or group practice.  Specifically, group practice physicians 
display lower levels of output than their solo practice counterparts.  As the structure of 
the GP/FP population (N) evolves and the prevalence of group practice physicians 
continues to increase relative to solo practice physicians, we can expect aggregate 
supply of physician services (VA) to fall, ceteris paribus. 
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5.2.5 Collective Effects of Gender, Age, Payment Method and Practice Size 
 
 The previous four segments have presented the expected individual effects that 
gender, age, payment method, and practice size will have on the supply of GP/FP 
services in Canada.  As the structure of the GP/FP population evolves, with respect to 
these four variables, the output of the aggregate GP/FP workforce will change.  
Specifically, the impending increase in the percentage of female GP/FPs, expected 
increase in GP/FP retirements, anticipated shift away from the fee-for-service payment 
method, and projected decrease in the number of solo practicing GP/FPs will all 
individually exert downward pressure on aggregate output as the groups of GP/FPs 
displaying lower levels of output increase in size, relative to the total workforce.  If the 
current combination of output patterns and population trends persists, one would expect 
the future availability of GP/FP services to fall. 
 On the other hand, the objective of this study was to identify the percentage of 
all that influences GP/FP output that is attributable to gender, age, payment method, and 
practice size.  These four variables – the most often cited as influencing output – 
explained no more than one fifth of the variance in any of the output measures used.  
Simply put, projections employing only GP/FP age, gender, payment method, and 
practice size, even when combined with associated trends in the physician population, 
are not sufficient to accurately pinpoint the future supply of GP/FP services.  Either 
there are additional unidentified factors that hold significant sway over the output 
patterns of physicians, or else these output patterns are simply so variable that they are 
unexplainable to any greater degree.   
 
5.2.6 External Influences on the Availability of GP/FP Services 
 The previous discussion, by and large, has focused on the effects of each 
independent variable under the assumption of ceteris paribus – without the 
consideration of outside factors.  This subsection will attempt to incorporate some 
externalities into the discussion, relaxing that assumption.  Specifically, what measures 
are being taken by governments and other organizations to combat these potential 
problems? 
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 Canadian health human resource policy makers are well aware of impending 
problems regarding access to primary care.  The focus of research and recommendation 
in this area has been on the absolute supply of physicians, as opposed to the work habits 
and output patterns of the physician population.  In 1999, the Canadian Health Forum 
Task Force on Physician Supply recommended increases to medical school enrolment 
positions.  Specifically, the report recommended that enrolment be increased from 1577 
to 2000 positions by the year 2000.  In addition, it was suggested that efforts should be 
increased to “retain and repatriate” Canadian physicians; increase provincially funded 
residency positions; develop a formal process for reviewing enrolment on a regular 
basis; and address issues regarding distribution and new care delivery models.41 
 A 2005 Physician Workforce paper published by the Canadian Medical 
Association praised the response of governments to the recommendations.  By 2004/05, 
medical school enrolments had increased by almost 40% to 2193.  The same CMA paper 
cautions, however, that these initiatives will not be sufficient to solve access problems 
and submits that national self-sufficiency would require that enrolments increase to at 
least 2500 new entrants per year.  The CMA, while condemning the systematic 
recruitment of international medical graduates, proposed an international on-line 
program that would allow international graduates to determine their suitability to 
completing post-MD training programs and entering Canadian practice.  In addition, the 
same publication urged rapid expansion of the post-MD training system as it is currently 
insufficient to accommodate the existing crop of eligible International Medical 
Graduates in Canada.42 
 As presented in the literature review, another contentious issue with significant 
potential impact on the availability of primary care services is that of primary care 
reform.  Policy analysts continue to look at new ways of providing primary care 
services, and while the concept of reform is supported by most, the appropriate model is 
greatly debated.  As stated at the outset, the primary care debate is comprised of two 
schools of thought: the professional model and the community model.  The former seeks 
an integrated approach to health care that would allow the physician to continue to hold 
primary responsibility over the provision of health services and to remain the gatekeeper 
to the rest of the health system.  The community model would seek broader reform, 
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placing overall well-being ahead of health service provision and reduce physicians to 
just one aspect of health care.25 
 Depending on which school of thought forms the basis for primary care reform, 
the result will be significant for primary care access.  If physicians are no longer the 
gatekeepers to the remainder of the health system, their output levels and the 
characteristics which influence them may be less integral to accessing primary care 
services.  In this case, perhaps the initial point of contact will shift from the physician to 
a nurse, nurse practitioner, or some other health professional, increasing the importance 
of these individuals with regard to access.  On the other hand, if physicians remain the 
sole gatekeeper with primary care responsibility, the potential problems upon which this 
study focused will remain as such, barring increases to average output levels, changes in 
physician population structural trends, or increases to the absolute number of physicians.   
 The original contribution to the existing body of literature – the quantification of 
the effects of the major output drivers – will improve decision making ability as it 
regards the supply of primary care services.  In addition, it is important that policy 
makers recognize the difference in output levels within the physician population; the 
current focus respecting primary care access seems to be on the absolute supply of 
physicians, as opposed to the individual physician’s penchant to conduct patient visits.  
The number of physicians, while important, is only half of the equation.  Equally vital 
are the characteristics that influence output and their constantly changing prevalence 
within the physician workforce. 
 
5.3 Research Implications 
 
5.3.1 Areas for Improvement 
 
The objective of this study was to test and quantify the effects of gender, age, 
payment method, and practice size on output of GP/FPs in Canada as measured by 
patient visits conducted, hours worked, and patient visits conducted per hour worked.  
The literature contained ample evidence that these four factor variables – gender, age, 
payment method, and practice size – held sway over physician output.  The present 
study sought to confirm or reject the prevailing view of the literature through an analysis 
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of data collected in the course of a survey of Canadian general and family practitioners.  
Going further, the intent was to provide an original contribution by determining the 
extent to which these variables contributed to the overall variance in GP/FP output. 
 The methodology employed was sufficient to meet the stated objectives.  The 
trends in the study data matched those reported within the literature, and statistically 
significant findings confirmed many of the latter’s prevailing views.  Regression 
analysis provided a method through which the contribution of the contingent of 
independent variables could be quantified; this was accomplished and reported within 
the study’s results.  In hindsight, however, the study methodology was not void of all 
limitation. 
 One limitation frequently cited within studies employing survey data is the size 
of the sample population.  The present study was no exception, as the data produced 
trends in many cases that could not be deemed statistically significant.  Sample 
stratification for gender made it necessary to analyze male and female physicians 
separately, effectively dividing the sample in half for many of the statistical procedures.  
While natural variability within the GP/FP sample can be blamed to some extent tests 
for statistical power of the comparisons were conducted and included in the tables 
presented in Section 4.  The associated methodology and calculations are included as 
Appendix E.  The results of these statistical power tests suggest that while some 
additional differences may have been identified if the sample were larger, the 
relationship between the effect sizes and statistical power indicate that for the most part 
the sample employed was sufficient. 
 In addition to constraints resulting from the sample size, the study may have 
suffered mildly due to the lack of measurement of a particular output driver identified 
within the literature.  Though not cited as often as the four measures tested, some 
sources suggested that a physician’s country of origin – more specifically the country 
from which he or she received their medical degree – may influence output.  The pool of 
data from which this study has drawn did not include a measurement of this 
characteristic.  Though data suggests that the pool of international medical graduates 
contains proportionally more male physicians and physicians who are older than the 
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domestic contingent – two characteristics which also influence output – the inclusion of 
this measure may have improved the study’s comprehensiveness. 
 
5.3.2 Contributions to Research 
 
 The original contribution of the present study is the quantification of the effects 
of gender, age, payment method, and practice size on GP/FP output of services.  The 
virtue of this contribution is in its implications for further research in this area.  
Previously it was quite clear that these four variables held some sway over the number 
of patient visits conducted by GP/FPs and their hours worked; even the type or direction 
of the relationships were identified with significant unanimity.  Prior to this study, 
however, the effects of gender, age, payment method, and practice size as a proportion 
of all that influences physician output had not been quantified. 
 The total contribution of the four variables in question to the output measures 
employed reached 19.4% at its highest level.  In other words, gender, age, payment 
method, and practice size account for 19.4% of all of the possible variables that 
influence GP/FP output.  The implication of this finding for other researchers is clear: 
what accounts for the remaining 80+%?  In addition, what is the nature of the additional 
factors: are they demographic, practice or physical characteristics and thus easily 
measured, or are they based on preferences and therefore less tangible? 
 If the unknown sources of the remaining variance can be ascertained, this will 
enable researchers to make better predictions regarding the future supply of physicians.  
As it stands, one cannot project current output levels by physician group, simply because 
the variance in output levels is too high.  Either physicians are simply too variable in 
their output behaviour, or there are some as yet unidentified factors influencing the 
workloads they choose to take on.  The current study has quantified the contribution of 
gender, age, payment method, and practice size, the four most often cited determinants 
of GP/FP output.  Now that this information is available, researchers in this area are 
better equipped to address the remaining factors in order to improve our understanding 
of physician output behaviour. 
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6.0 Conclusion 
 
 The analysis conducted above has provided support to the prevailing views held 
within the literature with respect to the effects of gender, age, payment method, and 
practice size on physician output of primary care services.  All four of these variables 
seem to impact the workloads of Canadian general and family practitioners, though 
some to greater extents than others.  These results confirm some impending problems 
with regard to the future availability of primary care services.  Specifically, the groups 
within the physician population which seem to display the lowest levels of output – the 
oldest and youngest physicians, female physicians, physicians remunerated through 
alternative payment methods, and physicians in group practice – are becoming larger in 
proportion to the GP/FP population as a whole.  This trend will create downward 
pressure on the aggregate supply of primary care services and make it more difficult for 
citizens to access these services. 
 Governments are aware of these potential difficulties, but policy makers seem to 
be addressing only part of the problem – the absolute number of physicians.  As vital are 
physician output patterns, as evidenced by the results presented above.  The supply of 
primary care services may fall as a result of the changing structure of the physician 
population, even if physician to citizen ratios persist.  For these reasons, this line of 
inquiry is vitally important and should be incorporated into physician supply 
discussions. 
 This study has made an original contribution to the health human resources 
literature.  Prior to this endeavour, an attempt to quantify the effects of gender, age, 
payment method, and practice size on general and family practitioner output of services 
had not been made.  This work, in addition to filling a pre-existing void in the literature, 
provides a starting point from which researchers in this area can expand the output 
model.  It is the author’s hope that further research can determine the additional factors 
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that influence GP/FP workloads and provide a more comprehensive list of output 
drivers. 
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Appendix B – Model Reductions 
 
Total Patient Visits / Week 
Significant contributors, in order of individual contribution: Gender, Payment Method, 
Practice Size 
 
Initial model  Y = β0 + β1Gender 
Adjusted r² = 0.085 
SSE1 = 3515263.8 
 
Addition of Payment Method  Y = β0 + β1Gender + β2Pay 
 
Adjusted r² = 0.152 
SSE2 = 3256791.1 
MSE2 = 3256.791 
k = 1 
n = 1003 
p = 1 
 
Tabulated F-Value = Fk,n-p-k-1 = F1,1000 = 3.84 
 
Decision Rule = If calculated F-value < 3.84 cannot conclude that the addition of 
payment method significantly improves the model. 
 
3642.79
791.3256
1
1.32567918.3515263
2
21
=
−
=
−
=
MSE
k
SSESSE
Fcalculated  > Ftab = 3.84 
 
Therefore, the addition of payment method to the model containing gender does 
significantly improve the model. 
 
Addition of Practice Size  Y = β0 + β1Gender + β2Pay + β3PSize  
 
SSE1 = 3256791.1 
MSE1 = 3256.791 
 
Adjusted r² = 0.162 
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SSE2 = 3213427.5 
MSE2 = 3219.867 
k = 1 
n = 1002 
p = 2 
 
Tabulated F-Value = Fk,n-p-k-1 = F1,998 = 3.84 
 
Decision Rule = If calculated F-value < 3.84 cannot conclude that the addition of 
payment method significantly improves the model. 
 
4675.13
867.3219
1
5.32134271.3256791
2
21
=
−
=
−
=
MSE
k
SSESSE
Fcalculated  > Ftab = 3.84 
 
Therefore, the addition of practice size to the model containing gender and payment 
method does significantly improve the model.  The best fit model for total patient visits 
is: 
 
   Y = β0 + β1Gender + β2Pay + β3PSize  
 
 
Patient Visits / Week – Regular Hours 
 
Significant contributors, in order of individual contribution: Payment Method, Gender, 
Practice Size 
Initial model  Y = β0 + β1Pay 
Adjusted r² = 0.090 
SSE1 = 2890745.7 
 
Addition of Gender  Y = β0 + β1Pay + β2Gender 
 
Adjusted r² = 0.172 
SSE2 = 2627412.2 
MSE2 = 2627.412 
k = 1 
n = 1003 
p = 1 
 
Tabulated F-Value = Fk,n-p-k-1 = F1,1000 = 3.84 
 
Decision Rule = If calculated F-value < 3.84 cannot conclude that the addition of gender 
significantly improves the model. 
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Therefore, the addition of gender to the model containing payment method does 
significantly improve the model. 
 
Addition of Practice Size  Y = β0 + β1Pay + β2Gender + β3PSize  
 
SSE1 = 2627412.2 
MSE1 = 2627.412 
 
Adjusted r² = 0.193 
SSE2 = 2554848.6 
MSE2 = 2559.969 
k = 1 
n = 1002 
p = 2 
 
Tabulated F-Value = Fk,n-p-k-1 = F1,998 = 3.84 
 
Decision Rule = If calculated F-value < 3.84 cannot conclude that the addition of 
payment method significantly improves the model. 
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Therefore, the addition of practice size to the model containing payment method and 
gender does significantly improve the model.  The best fit model for patient visits per 
week during regular hours is: 
 
   Y = β0 + β1Pay + β2Gender + β3PSize  
 
 
Patient Visits / Week – On Call 
 
Significant contributors, in order of individual contribution: Gender, Practice Size, Age 
Initial model  Y = β0 + β1Gender 
Adjusted r² = 0.008 
SSE1 = 455888.43 
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Addition of Practice Size  Y = β0 + β1Gender + β2PSize 
 
Adjusted r² = 0.017 
SSE2 = 451478.16 
MSE2 = 451.027 
k = 1 
n = 1004 
p = 1 
 
Tabulated F-Value = Fk,n-p-k-1 = F1,1001 = 3.84 
 
Decision Rule = If calculated F-value < 3.84 cannot conclude that the addition of age 
significantly improves the model. 
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Therefore, the addition of practice size to the model containing gender does significantly 
improve the model. 
 
Addition of Age  Y = β0 + β1Gender + β2PSize + β3PAge  
 
SSE1 = 451478.16 
MSE1 = 451.027 
 
 
Adjusted r² = 0.025 
SSE2 = 446941.27 
MSE2 = 448.286 
k = 1 
n = 1001 
p = 2 
 
Tabulated F-Value = Fk,n-p-k-1 = F1,997 = 3.84 
 
Decision Rule = If calculated F-value < 3.84 cannot conclude that the addition of 
practice size significantly improves the model. 
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Therefore, the addition of age to the model containing gender and practice size does 
significantly improve the model.  The best fit model for patient visits per week during 
on call is: 
 
   Y = β0 + β1Gender + β2PSize + β3Age  
 
 
Hours Worked / Week 
 
Significant contributors, in order of individual contribution: Gender, Practice Size 
Initial model  Y = β0 + β1Gender 
Adjusted r² = 0.107 
SSE1 = 136690.63 
 
Addition of Practice Size  Y = β0 + β1Gender + β2PSize 
 
Adjusted r² = 0.113 
SSE2 = 135846.22 
MSE2 = 135.711 
k = 1 
n = 1004 
p = 1 
 
Tabulated F-Value = Fk,n-p-k-1 = F1,1001 = 3.84 
 
Decision Rule = If calculated F-value < 3.84 cannot conclude that the addition of 
practice size significantly improves the model. 
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Therefore, the addition of practice size to the model containing gender does significantly 
improve the model.  The best fit model for hours worked per week is: 
 
   Y = β0 + β1Gender + β2PSize  
 
 
Patients / Hour Worked 
 
Significant contributors, in order of individual contribution: Payment Method, Gender, 
Practice Size, Age 
 
Initial model  Y = β0 + β1Pay 
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Adjusted r² = 0.076 
SSE1 = 1488.36 
 
Addition of Gender  Y = β0 + β1Pay + β2Gender 
 
Adjusted r² = 0.086 
SSE2 = 1473.202 
MSE2 = 1.473 
k = 1 
n = 1003 
p = 1 
 
Tabulated F-Value = Fk,n-p-k-1 = F1,1000 = 3.84 
 
Decision Rule = If calculated F-value < 3.84 cannot conclude that the addition of 
payment method significantly improves the model. 
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Therefore, the addition of gender to the model containing payment method does 
significantly improve the model. 
 
Addition of Practice Size  Y = β0 + β1Pay + β2Gender + β3PSize  
 
SSE1 = 1473.202 
MSE1 = 1.473 
 
Adjusted r² = 0.086 
SSE2 = 1468.823 
MSE2 = 1.472 
k = 1 
n = 1002 
p = 2 
 
Tabulated F-Value = Fk,n-p-k-1 = F1,998 = 3.84 
 
Decision Rule = If calculated F-value < 3.84 cannot conclude that the addition of 
payment method significantly improves the model. 
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Therefore, the addition of practice size to the model containing payment method and 
gender does not significantly improve the model.  Practice size should be excluded from 
the model. 
 
Addition of Age  Y = β0 + β1Pay + β2Gender + β3Age  
 
SSE1 = 1468.823 
MSE1 = 1.472 
 
Adjusted r² = 0.089 
SSE2 = 1461.335 
MSE2 = 1.467 
k = 1 
n = 1000 
p = 3 
 
Tabulated F-Value = Fk,n-p-k-1 = F1,995 = 3.84 
 
Decision Rule = If calculated F-value < 3.84 cannot conclude that the addition of 
payment method significantly improves the model. 
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Therefore, the addition of age to the model containing payment method and gender does 
significantly improve the model.  The best fit model for patient visits per hour worked 
is: 
 
 
   Y = β0 + β1Pay + β2Gender + β3Age  
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Appendix C – Summary of Findings 
 
Table A-C.1 – Summary of Findings 
Output Measure / 
Dependent Variable 
Differences within 
Independent Variables Best Fit Model 
R² for Best 
Fit Model 
(%) 
Total Patients / Week 
Gender: 
- Males > Females 
 
Age: 
- Females: 45-54 > 35-44; 55-64 
> 35-44 
- Males: none 
 
Payment Method: 
- Females: (>80% FFS) > (<20% 
FFS); (20-80%) > (<20% FFS) 
 
- Males: (<80% FFS) > (20-80% 
FFS) > (<20% FFS) 
 
Practice Size: 
- Females: Solo > 5+ Physicians 
- Males: none 
Gender; 
 
Payment Method; 
 
Practice Size 
16.2 
Patients / Week – Regular 
Hours 
Gender: 
- Males > Females 
 
Age: 
- Females: (<35) < 55-64; 35-44 < 
45-54; 35-44 < 55-64; 55-64 > 
65+ 
- Males: none 
 
Payment Method: 
- Females: (<80% FFS) > (20-
80% FFS) > (<20% FFS) 
 
- Males: (<80% FFS) > (20-80% 
FFS) > (<20% FFS) 
 
Practice Size: 
- Females: Solo > 4 Physicians; 
Solo > 5+ Physicians 
- Males: none 
Payment Method; 
 
Gender; 
 
Practice Size 
19.3 
Patients / Week – On Call 
Gender:   
- Males > Females 
 
Age: 
- none 
 
Payment Method: 
- none 
 
Practice Size: 
- none 
Gender; 
 
Practice Size; 
 
Age 
2.5 
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Hours Worked / Week 
Gender: 
- Males > Females 
 
Age: 
- Females: 35-44 < 45-54; 35-44 
< 55-64; 55-64 > 65+ 
- Males: none 
 
Payment Method: 
- Females: none 
- Males: (>80% FFS) > (<20% 
FFS) 
 
Practice Size: 
- Females: Solo > 2 Physicians; 
Solo > 3 Physicians; Solo > 4 
Physicians; Solo > 5+ 
Physicians 
- Males: none 
Gender; 
 
Practice Size 
11.3 
Patients / Hour Worked 
Gender: 
- Males > Females 
 
Age: 
- none 
 
Payment Method: 
- Females: (>80% FFS) > (<20% 
FFS); (20-80% FFS) > (<20% 
FFS) 
 
- Males: (>80% FFS) > (<20% 
FFS); (>80% FFS) > (20-80% 
FFS) 
 
Practice Size: 
- None 
Payment Method; 
 
Gender; 
 
Age 
8.9 
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Appendix D – Post Hoc Analysis – Solo vs. Group Practice 
 
Table  A-D.1 –Collapsed Practice Size Variable vs. Output - Females 
Mean STD Mean STD
Total Patients 143.36 67.98 117.55 51.57 25.81 0.005
Patients During 
Regular Hours 134.69 63.12 105.70 46.40 28.99 0.001
Patients During 
Oncall 8.67 16.16 11.85 20.83 -3.18 0.159
Hours Per Week 46.53 11.98 40.46 11.93 6.07 0.000
Patients Per 
Hour
3.14 1.52 2.98 1.20 0.16 0.429
t-test - Practice Size vs. Output - Females
Mean 
Difference 
(S-G)
P-ValueMeasure Solo (N=64)
Practice Size
Group (N=462)
 
 
Table A-D.2 –Collapsed Practice Size Variable vs. Output - Males 
Mean STD Mean STD
Total Patients 174.74 68.13 154.12 63.07 20.62 0.020
Patients During 
Regular Hours 162.44 62.46 138.14 57.01 24.31 0.003
Patients During 
Oncall 12.30 17.42 16.13 23.06 -3.83 0.110
Hours Per Week 50.70 10.52 49.09 11.31 1.61 0.245
Patients Per 
Hour
3.48 1.36 3.20 1.27 0.28 0.111
t-test - Practice Size vs. Output - Males
Mean 
Difference 
(S-G)
P-ValueMeasure Solo (N=70)
Practice Size
Group (N=407)
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Appendix E – Power Calculations 
 
 In hypothesis testing, there are two types of potential error: 1) rejecting a null 
hypothesis when it should not be rejected; and 2) failing to reject a null hypothesis when 
it should be rejected.  The first error has been called ‘Type I error,’ and is addressed 
through the employment of an α (alpha) value. This α is the amount of Type I error the 
researcher is willing to accept – in other words, the percentage of tests in which the 
researcher is willing to reject a null hypothesis that should not be rejected.  In the 
present study, and in many other quantitative studies, the α chosen was 0.05.  This 
means that the author was willing to risk a ‘false positive’ in 5 per cent of cases.43 
 Type II errors occur when the researcher fails to reject a null hypothesis that 
should have been rejected.  This error is address through the use of a ß (beta) value; the 
percentage tests in which the researcher is willing to fail to reject a null hypothesis that 
should have been rejected.  ß values range between 0.00 and 1.00.  By subtracting ß 
from 1, the researcher can determine the ‘statistical power’ of the test.  In other words, 
Power = 1 – ß.  Most researchers strive for power levels of 0.80 or higher (in other 
words, ß of 0.20 or lower).43  This means that no more than 2 out of every 10 failures to 
reject the null hypothesis are incorrect. 
 The power of a statistical test, according to Hair et al, is a function of three 
things: 1) the sample size; 2) the alpha level chosen; and 3) the effect size of the test.  In 
the present study, it is not possible to adjust the size of the sample ex poste – data has 
been collected and analyzed.  The alpha level chosen was 0.05.  The effect size, 
according to Hair et al, is a measure of the magnitude of a difference between groups.  
The more obvious the difference is, the larger the effect size, the smaller the difference, 
the lower the effect size. 
 Cohen developed a tool through which researchers could measure effect size 
when employing analysis of variance techniques: 
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 Where d is the effect size which is equal to the difference between group means 
(m1 – m2) divided by the square root of the mean squared error identified by the 
ANOVA procedure.  The resulting d value, according to Cohen, indicates the number of 
standard deviations between the two mean values being compared.  Cohen’s d values for 
the current study were presented in the comparative analysis tables in Section 4.   
 Pfaffenberger and Patterson44 provide a method through which the required 
sample size can be estimated if the researcher knows the levels of alpha and beta they 
wish to employ, the standard deviation of their population, and the mean difference 
between the groups being compared: 
2
2/
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d
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 Where n is the required sample size to reach a power level of 1 – ß given an α 
and the standard deviation (σ).  Here, (d) is the difference between group means.  Given 
the nature of the present study, n is fixed and the analysis has been completed – ex ante 
adjustments can no longer be made.  However, by rearranging the terms in the formula 
presented by Pfaffenberger and Patterson, one can isolate the ß value and perform 
calculations to determine the statistical power of the tests that have already been 
completed: 
2/2
2
αβ σ
z
dn
z −
×
=           (E.3) 
 
 The formula requires the use of z-scores, which can be obtained from z-tables of 
standard normal cumulative probabilities available in most statistical textbooks.  This 
procedure enables the researcher to ascertain the power levels achieved by the statistical 
techniques conducted. 
 In the present study, 235 category to category comparisons were made on the 
basis of gender (male vs. female), age (< 35 vs. 35-44 vs. 45-54 vs. 55-64 vs. 65+), 
payment method (<20% FFS vs. 20-80% FFS vs. >80% FFS), and group size (solo vs. 
two vs. three vs. four vs. five) and the five output measures (total patients, regular 
 134 
patients, on call patients, hours worked, and patients per hour).  Of these 235 
comparisons, 31 saw the null hypothesis (that there would be no difference in output) 
rejected.  Of the total 235 comparisons, 124 were deemed to have statistical power of 
0.80 or greater.  All of the comparisons for which the null hypotheses were rejected had 
statistical power of 0.80 or greater.  Of the remaining 111 tests that did not have 
statistical power greater than 0.80, not a single one had an effect size (Cohen’s d) greater 
than 0.3.   
While an increased sample size may have resulted in the identification of more 
statistically significant differences, the relationship between effect size and statistical 
power suggests that most sample sizes were sufficient. 
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